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In many common law liberal democracies today, news gatherers are resisting efforts 
to use the powers of the courts to compel the news gatherers to identify their 
confidential sources.  Often the struggles are epic.  Often the public interest in 
effective news gathering fuelling the vitality of a modern liberal democracy is 
insufficiently recognized.  The author uses recent cases to spotlight the shortfalls in 
the approach and legacy of the common law in dealing with news gatherer/ 
confidential source relationships.  Post HRA English decisions, especially that of 
Tugendhat J in Ackroyd, combining European style commitment to the public interest 
in vigorous newsgathering with common law style analysis of evidence, point the way 
to a more effective approach.  US and Hong Kong cases remind news gatherers of 






Protection Against Judicially Compelled Disclosure of the Identity of News 
Gatherers’ Confidential Sources in Common Law Jurisdictions. 
 




The professional codes of journalists’1 associations in liberal democratic2 common 
law jurisdictions3 typically contain a statement to the effect that a journalist must 
protect the identity of a confidential source.4  Clearly, these codes create a 
                                                 
* Department of Law, University of Hong Kong.  I wish to thank the referees for their constructive 
and very helpful comments. 
1 Narrowly defined as ‘a person employed to write for, edit, or report for a newspaper, journal or news 
cast’, Della Thompson (ed), Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
9th ed, 1995), commonly used to include freelance contributors of articles as well.  
2 Referring to jurisdictions committed to self governance by a free people. 
3 Referring to those jurisdictions that recognize judge made law within the English tradition and in 
contrast to code jurisdictions. 
4 See for example, The American Society of Newspaper Editors ‘…pledges of confidentiality to news 
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professional obligation not to disclose source information in response to questions not 
backed by judicial orders or freestanding statutory obligations to answer.5  Although 
not members of a professional body, other news gatherers frequently acknowledge 
similar obligations.  Uncompelled disclosure might also amount to a breach of 
contract or, in the US, found an action for promissory estoppel.6 But what if a judge 
issues a subpoena, witness order or search warrant, or orders discovery, the 
administration of interrogatories or the production of documents, in each case with the 
object of identifying a news gatherer’s confidential source? What if a statute requires 
anyone with certain information to disclose that information and its source, and a 
news gatherer receives such information from a source in confidence?7  What are the 
news gatherer’s obligations then? 
 
If the judicial order or legislation withstands procedural, substantive and 
constitutional challenge, their legal obligation must be to comply with the order or law.  
The health of a liberal democracy requires that the rule of law apply to news gatherer 
citizens as much as any other.  But under what circumstances do judges in liberal 
democratic common law jurisdictions make orders like these?  Have judges found 
such orders to be constitutionally valid according to the freedom of expression or free 
press guarantees in such jurisdictions?  Should liberal democracies provide special 
protection against judicially compelled disclosure of the identities of news gatherers’ 
confidential sources?  This article addresses each of these three questions. 
 
They are questions that are currently being debated in legislatures and the media, and 
fought over in courtrooms and commissions of inquiry in many parts of the common 
law world.8  Five illustrative cases provide a useful focus.   
                                                                                                                                            
sources must be honored at all costs…’; Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice, clause 14 
“Journalists have a moral obligation to protect confidential sources of information”, quoted in Ackroyd 
(2) (n 24 below); Code of British National Union of Journalists (1994), ‘A journalist shall protect 
confidential sources of information’, reproduced as Item 7 of the Code of Ethics of the Hong Kong 
Journalists Association; Australian Journalists Association and the MEAA/ AJA Standard 19, ‘Keep 
confidences in good faith.’  The Canadian Association of Journalists: Guidelines for Investigative 
Journals, approved 2004, http://www.caj.ca/principles/principles-statement-investigative-2004 (Last 
visited 25 October 2005), is more detailed and sophisticated. 
5 Absent such professional obligations, news gatherers would have the same right as everyone else to 
choose whether to answer other people’s questions, see Viscount Dilhorne in British Steel Corporation 
v Granada Television Ltd. [1981] AC 1096, 1181H – 1182A . 
6 Cohen v Cowles Media Co. 501 US 663 (1991), Ruzicka v Conde Nast Publications In., 999 F. 2d 
1319 (8th Cir 1993).  Surely, disclosure in obedience to a court order would not be actionable, George 
G. Ventura v The Cincinnati Enquirer and Ganett Company Inc 396 F.3d 784. 
7 For example, the Terrorism Act 2000, s 19 (UK). 
8 In addition to the more than 25 post 2000 cases otherwise mentioned herein see: ITN, ‘Legal 
Landmark’, at http://www.channel4.com/news/2004/02/week_2/13_ruling (Last visited 25 October 
2005), describing the conflict between Lord Saville, Chairman of the UK Bloody Sunday Inquiry and 
Independent Television News, reporter Alex Thomson and then producer Lena Ferguson; Canada 
(Attorney General) v Juliett O’Neill [2004] O.J. No. 4649, 2004 On.C LEXIS 5106 continued in 
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In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller/ Matthew Cooper9
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
Early in 2004, a special prosecutor and a federal grand jury began investigating the 
possibly illegal10 naming of a covert CIA operative to several journalists, including 
reporters Matthew Cooper (Time magazine) and Judith Miller (New York Times) by 
sources described as ‘top White House officials’.11 The sources may have intended to 
discredit or punish the operative’s husband,12 whose public revelations about his CIA 
sanctioned investigation into alleged Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa had 
undermined part of President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address.13  The special 
prosecutor subpoenaed Cooper, Miller and Time Inc, Cooper’s employer, demanding 
disclosure of the identity of the sources.  All refused to comply.14 On 15 February 
2005, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed their 
consolidated appeals against consequential findings of civil contempt.15 An 
application for a rehearing en banc was rejected.16 The US Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on 27 June 2005.17 Time Inc then produced Cooper’s ‘notes, tape recordings, 
e-mails and other documents’ as ordered.18  Cooper later testified when released 
from confidentiality commitments by his source.19  Miller was sent to jail for civil 
contempt on 6 July 2005.20
                                                                                                                                            
Canada (Attorney General) v O’Neill 2005 CarswellOnt 2115 198 C.C.C. (3d) 143; R v Canadian 
Broadcasting Corp. 2006 CarswellOnt 1119; Kennedy v Lovell [2002] WASCA 217 (a Royal 
Commission/ contempt case); In re Special Proceedings 373 F. 3d 37 (1st Cir 2004) (Tim Taricani’s 
case); cases noted by Bill Kenworthy in ‘Ongoing confidential-sources cases’ (08.04.05) at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=15634 (Last visited 23 March 2006). 
9 Strictly cited as In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller) 397 F 3d 964. 
10 See, for example, Intelligence Protection Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 122. 
11 A term used in media accounts and quoted in In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 966 per Circuit 
Judge Sentelle. 
12 Cooper suggested this, ibid, 1003 per Circuit Judge Tatel. The sources implied that the husband had 
been given the investigative task through some inappropriate influence from the operative. 
13 ibid, 966 per Judge Sentelle. 
14 Historically, for Miller see In re: Special Counsel Investigation Misc No 04-407(TFH) 338 F. Supp. 
2d 16 (rejection of motion to quash subpoenas); In Re Special Counsel Investigation 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1842 (D.D.C., Sept. 15, 2004) (contempt holding). For Cooper see In re: Special Counsel 
Investigation 346 F. Supp. 2d 54; 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23241 (Nov. 10, 2004) and ibid, 966-967 for 
other dates. 
15 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above. 
16 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Judith Miller No. 04-3138 consolidated with 04-3139, 04-3140 2005 
US App LEXIS 6608; Matthew Cooper v US 04-1508 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5191. 
17 Supreme Court of the United States Order List 545 US for Monday, 27 June 2005, p10; Judith Miller 
v US 04-1507, 2005 US LEXIS. 
18 B. Saporito, ‘When to Give Up a Source’, 11 July 2005 Time at 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1079501,00 (Last visited 25 October 2005).  
19 M. Cooper, ‘What I told the Grand Jury’ 25 July 2005 Time Archive at 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1083899,00 (Last visited 25 October 2005).    
20 Editorial, ‘Judith Miller Goes to Jail’ 7 July 2005 NY Times, Section A, p 22. Miller was released on 
29 September 2005, after agreeing to testify and handover notes about her relevant conversations with I. 
Lewis Libby, chief of staff for Vice President Cheney on the following day.  Miller claimed she agreed 
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Ashworth Hospital Authority v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd21 House of Lords 
An English newspaper published an article critical of a secure mental health hospital 
run by Ashworth Hospital Authority (AHA).  The article included quotes from 
hospital PACIS records about a controversial patient.22 On the basis that the records 
were highly confidential medical records probably leaked by an AHA employee, AHA 
obtained a Norwich Pharmacal discovery order23 requiring the newspaper’s owners, 
MGN Ltd, to identify the paper’s source, thereby enabling AHA to take disciplinary 
action.  MGN Ltd appealed the order all the way to the House of Lords, relying upon 
section 10 of the Contempt Act 1981, a section that provides some protection against 
judicially compelled disclosure of news gatherers’ confidential sources.  The case 
was heard after the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) had come into force.  The House 
of Lords upheld the order.  
 
Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd24 Queen’s Bench, Tugendhat J 
Robin Ackroyd, a freelance journalist who had investigated and written about 
Ashworth Hospital for many years, came forward as the newspaper’s paid 
intermediary source for the Ashworth articles.  The AHA’s successor, the Mersey 
Care NHS Trust, sought a Norwich Pharmacal order compelling Ackroyd to disclose 
the identity of his source.  Ackroyd resisted, again citing section 10 of the Contempt 
                                                                                                                                            
after receiving a voluntary waiver from her source, S. Schmidt, J.VandeHei, ‘N.Y. Times Reporter 
Released From Jail: Miller to Testify in CIA Leak Probe’ 30 September 2005 Washington Post, A01.  
Libby was subsequently charged with obstruction of justice and perjury offences.  He also subpoenaed 
Cooper and Miller, amongst others, requesting a wide range of documentary material – but was only 
permitted to obtain certain article drafts from Cooper, ‘In re Special Counsel Investigation (Valerie 
Plame investigation)’ at http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html. 
21 [2002] UKHL 29; [2002] 1 WLR 2033.  
22 PACIS refers to a computer database known as ‘Patient Administrative and Clinical Information 
Service, Ackroyd 2 n 24 below at [23].  Ackroyd denied the PACIS records were ‘medical records’, 
describing them as a ‘diary’ in his articles, otherwise as a hospital administrative log, M. Holderness, 
‘Sources in Peril’ January 2003 Freelance at http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/o301whis. (Last visited 10 
October 2005).  However, the HL in Ashworth n 21 above, the CA in Ackroyd (1) n 26 below and 
Tugendhat J in Ackroyd (2) n 24 below, the latter two after having seen the full records, all accepted 
them as medical records. 
23 An order derived from the old bill of discovery, given new life in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs 
and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, available to a plaintiff as the sole remedy sought in an 
action against a person who, ‘albeit innocently, and without incurring any personal liability, becomes 
involved in a wrongful act of another [thereby coming] … under a duty to assist the person injured by 
those acts by giving him any information which he is able to give by way of discovery that discloses 
the identity of the wrong doer.’ See Ashworth n 21 above at [26]. Norwich Pharmacal discovery was 
first applied to news gatherers in British Steel (n 5 above).  Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
colonies like Hong Kong have all followed Norwich Pharmacal.  As to the US see R. Barron, 
‘Existence and Nature of Cause of Action for Equitable Bill of Discovery’ (1996-2005) 37 A.L.R. 5th 
645.  For an illustration of pre-action discovery used against news gatherers, see In the matter of 
Harold Dack, Petitioner. Beni Broadcasting of Rochester, Inc., et al., Respondents 1979 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 2709. 
24 [2006] EWHC 107 (7 February 2006) (QB), hereafter Ackroyd (2). The Trust was given leave to 
appeal. 
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Act 1981.  The Trust obtained summary judgment on the ground that the issues had 
already been determined in Ashworth.25  Ackroyd successfully appealed,26 winning 
the right to a full hearing at which Tugendhat J finally held that Ackroyd need not 
disclose his source. 
 
So Wing Keung27 v Sing Tao Ltd and Hsu Hiu Yee28 Hong Kong SAR CA 
A woman involved in a corruption trial became a protected witness.  Lawyers 
involved in the case brought a habeas corpus application claiming she was being held 
unlawfully by the HKSAR Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The 
application was dismissed as totally unfounded.  The judge suspected an attempt to 
intimidate the witness. The proceedings were closed and yet seven HK newspapers 
published articles about them, including the witness’s details, thereby probably 
committing a serious criminal offence.29  There may have been a leak, perhaps also 
with the object of intimidation.  Using sections 83-89 of the Interpretation and 
General Clauses Ordinance (IGCO), the ICAC obtained and executed search warrants 
against the business premises of the seven newspapers, including the Sing Tao Daily, 
and the homes of some reporters, including Hsu Hiu Yee, a Sing Tao reporter, with the 
object of identifying the culprit.  On application by Sing Tao Ltd and Hsu, a judge 
quashed the warrants relating to them.30  The Hong Kong SAR Court of Appeal 
rejected the ICAC’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds but made it very clear they 
believed the original decision to grant the warrants was justified.  Neither side 
appealed.31  
 
R v McManus, R v Harvey 2005 Victoria County Court Australia32
In February, 2004, Gerard McManus and Michael Harvey of the Herald Sun 
newspaper published an article based on information in a confidential government 
                                                 
25 Ackroyd v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 2115 (QB). 
26 Ackroyd v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 663 (16 May 2003); [2003] All ER (D) 235, 
[2003] EMLR 36 hereafter Ackroyd (1). 
27 HSU was the ICAC investigator who applied for the warrants. 
28 [2005] 2 HKLRD 11. 
29 Witness Protection Ordinance (Cap 564), section 17.  A solicitor and others were subsequently 
convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice in relation to the habeas corpus application.  A 
barrister was convicted of attempting to commit a Witness Protection Ordinance offence. A journalist 
who co-wrote one of the articles in the South China Morning Post but was granted immunity by the 
prosecution, identified the barrister as the ‘legal source’ mentioned in her article, P. Hui, ‘3 guilty of 
ICAC plot, Egan of leak attempts’ 13 June 2006 SCMP A1. 
30 So Wing Keung v Sing Tao Limited and Hsu Hiu Yee HCMP 1833/2004; 2004 HKCU LEXIS 1121.  
31 Gary Cheung, “ICAC drops appeal over ruling on media raid” 31 October 2004 South China 
Morning Post, News Section, 5 (Last visited 25 October 2005).  ICAC access to the sealed material 
had already been agreed by Sing Tao by the time of the appeal. 
32 See J. Madden, ‘Journalists facing jail for contempt’ 24 August 2005 at http://www.news.com.au 
(Last visited 29 August 2005); G. Ansley, ‘Australia gets tough on journalists’ 27 August 2005 at 
http://nzherald.co.nz (Last visited 29 August 2005).   
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document about Australian Federal Government plans to break a promise about war 
veterans’ pensions.  Embarrassed, the Government backed down but the civil servant 
suspected of leaking the document was prosecuted.  At a pre-trial hearing in August 
2005, the prosecution called McManus and Harvey and asked for the name of their 
source. They refused, citing professional responsibilities, and were charged with 
criminal contempt.33 The civil servant was subsequently convicted without the 
journalists’ evidence.34  
 
Together, these cases provide windows into the current substantive law and practice 
relating to judicially compelled disclosure of news gatherers’ sources in their 
respective jurisdictions. They also provide much of the framework for the discussion 
of the main themes of this article. 
 
First, the cases indicate that the concept of special protection from judicially 
compelled disclosure of news gatherers’ confidential sources is not precise and needs 
to be defined and explained.  This is done in Part II of this article. 
 
Second, the cases demonstrate the limited protection the majority of judges in the four 
jurisdictions have been willing to give to news gatherer/ confidential source 
relationships. This is evident both in standard common law analysis in this area – and 
in the interpretation and application of relevant legislation – even legislation intended 
to provide special protection to news gatherer/ confidential source relationships. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, Sing Tao and Australian and Canadian case law suggest that 
the common law judges’ skepticism towards news gatherers’ confidential sources has 
also permeated constitutional analysis of freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression guarantees in those jurisdictions. The judges’ approaches to claims for 
special protection for news gatherer/ confidential source relationships – including 
claims based upon constitutional provisions – are discussed in Parts III and IV of this 
article. 
 
In Parts V and VI attention is turned to the third question noted above: should liberal 
democracies provide special protection against judicially compelled disclosure of the 
identities of news gatherers’ confidential sources?  The illustrative cases also make a 
valuable contribution to the discussion of this question. 
                                                 
33 N. Robinson, ‘Reporters Charged over Leaks’ 14 October 2005 The Australian at 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,16913878,00 (Last visited 14 October 2005). 
As of 1 July 2006, their contempt hearing was postponed pending an appeal. 
34 ‘Public servant guilty of document leak’ at 




First, the cases show that special protection of news gatherer/ confidential source 
relationships, if granted, would come with significant public and private costs.  For 
example, the public interest in ensuring the due administration of justice in the 
courts35 is also fundamental in a liberal democracy – and often requires court and 
party access to relevant factual material.  Special protection from judicially 
compelled disclosure of the identity of a news gatherer’s source would deny courts 
access to some relevant material. That would be a significant public cost in any 
proceedings, a devastating public/private cost if the litigant could not then obtain 
redress, here including a criminal conviction, for an admitted legal wrong.  Public 
interests in the protection of national security or personal privacy, or the prevention of 
crime might also be affected.  Therefore, before special protection from judicially 
compelled disclosure of the identity of news gatherer sources can be demanded it 
must first be established that in most cases, the public interest in news gatherers’ 
source protection outweighs the costs of nondisclosure.  The case for special 
protection of news gatherers’ confidential sources from judicially compelled 
disclosure is set out in Part V. 
 
Second, the cases demonstrate that uncertainties in the law and approaches to 
protection for news gatherers’ sources that rely upon case by case ad hoc judicial 
assessments encourage confrontation and litigation between those seeking the identity 
of the source and the news gatherers.  The consequential court battles in which 
neither side is willing to be seen to have given way, are personally, institutionally and 
publicly resource expensive.36  Ad hoc approaches also mean the level of real 
protection may vary with the level of a presiding judge’s commitment.  Assuming 
acceptance of the argument in Part V, Part VI considers how efficient and effective 
protection for news gatherer/ confidential source relationships might best be achieved. 
 
But first specialized terminology used in this article and the precise parameters of the 
discussion must be clarified.  As to terminology, three terms require explanation.  
First ‘news gatherer’ is here used to include any legal person who, using any medium, 
personally or by means of full or part time employees, agents, or freelance 
contributors, gathers37 or researches information with the intention of communicating, 
or whilst seriously considering communicating, to the public, or any section thereof, 
                                                 
35 Likewise the public interest in the proper and effective functioning of grand juries and commissions 
of inquiry. 
36 J. Nestler, ‘The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the 
Journalist’s Privilege’ (2005) 154 U.Pa. L. Rev. 201, 243-246. 
37 Including passive receipt of information from a volunteer source. 
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information they believe to be accurate, or work product derived from such 
information.  The words, ‘with the intention of communicating … information they 
believe to be accurate’ are crucial.  News gatherers are not infallible but a person 
who has no care for the truth of content to be published is a creator or disseminator of 
fiction or gossip, not a news gatherer.38 Otherwise the definition is deliberately broad, 
including media corporations, journalists, pamphleteers, authors of books, 
‘bloggers’,39 even some website hosts,40 thereby avoiding arbitrary distinctions, 
counterbalancing some of the worst effects of modern media conglomerates and 
focusing attention on what is really significant – the news gathering character of a 
person’s activity, not her medium, title, corporate structure or power base.41   
 
Second, ‘confidential sources’ refers to people, including news gatherers like Ackroyd, 
who provide information to a news gatherer pursuant to an express or implicit 
undertaking or understanding that, although the information provided may be 
published, the identity of the source will not be disclosed.  Sources who merely 
prefer not to be identified if possible, or whose identities the news gatherer wishes to 
protect for commercial reasons only, are not confidential sources for the purposes of 
this article. 
 
                                                 
38 In re Mark Madden; Titan Sports Inc., A Delaware Corporation v Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. 
and Others 151 F.3d 125, 128-129 (3rd Cir 1998). 
39 A blogger is someone who posts a ‘web log’ or on line diary, using material of the blogger’s choosing, 
open to comment by others. 
40 Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd and Ors [2001] E.M.L.R. 29.  See also the Court of Appeal decision 
at [2001] EWCA Civ 1897; [2002] 1 WLR 1233 reversing Owen J’s decision to award costs against 
second defendant, Interactive Investor Limited. Denying internet service providers (ISPs) the status of 
‘journalist’ or ‘news gatherer’ does not necessarily leave the ISP without freedom of expression 
protection, J. O’Brien, ‘Putting A Face To A (Screen) Name: The First Amendment Implications Of 
Compelling ISPs to Reveal The Identities of Anonymous Internet Speakers In Online Defamation 
Cases’ (2002) 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2745. 
41 See L. Berger, ‘Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s 
Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication’ (2003) 39 Houston L. Rev. 1371; J. Elrod, ‘Protecting 
Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal for a Federal Statute’ (2003) 7 N.Y.U. Legis. & Pub. 
Pol’y 115. Cf. L. Alexander, ‘Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the 
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information’ 
(2000) 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97.  As to the special circumstances of those reporting on armed 
conflicts see A. Heeger, “Securing a Journalist’s Testimonial Privilege in the International Criminal 
Court” (2005) 6 San Diego Int’l L.J. 209. As to bloggers see R. O’Neil, ‘Protection of the Pen: The 
Hazards of Online Journalism’ Spring 2005 Cyberlaw at 
http://www.itc.virginia.edu/virginia.edu/spring05/cyberlaw (Last visited 25 October 2005) For relevant 
judicial comment see Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 703-705 (1972) per Justice White; In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 979-980 per Judge Sentelle, cf 995 per Judge Tatel; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, No. 01-20745 (unreported) (the ‘Leggett’ case); In re Mark Madden n 38 above, 128-129 
applying von Bulow v von Bulow 811 F 2d 136 (2nd Cir 1987); Shoen v Shoen 5 F. 3d 1289 (9th Cir 
1993); Jason O’Grady et al v The Superior Court of Santa Clara Count (Respondent); Apple 
Computer , Inc. (Real Party in Interest), H028579/ 2006, Court of Appeal of the State of California (6th 
Appellate District) at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_Does/H028579.pdf (Last visited 6 July 
2006). 
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Third, the phrase, ‘judicially compelled disclosure’ is used to include disclosure 
obtained by any form of judicial order, whether in connection with court proceedings 
or otherwise, disclosure commanded by legislation and related enforcement 
proceedings.  Effective protection against judicially compelled disclosure of news 
gatherer/ confidential sources requires that protection to extend across the whole 
range of possible processes and types of proceedings.42
 
As to the parameters of the discussion, this article is not concerned with (i) the 
existence of, or need for, protection for news gatherers’ personal observations or work 
product not connected to the identity of a confidential source,43 (ii) criminal liability 
of news gatherers for receipt of stolen documents from sources44 or (iii) proper 
professional conduct when faced with valid judicial orders demanding disclosure,45 
all issues worthy of in depth consideration on their own.  
 
II THE NATURE OF SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST JUDICIALLY 
COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF NEWS GATHERERS’ CONFIDENTIAL 
SOURCE IDENTITIES 
 
Qualified or absolute protection. 
A jurisdiction has special protection against judicially compelled disclosure of the 
identity of news gatherers’ confidential sources only when at least in some 
circumstances, notwithstanding satisfaction of all standard prerequisites for the 
granting of the relevant judicial order, including in particular relevance, good faith 
and reasonableness,46 news gatherers cannot be judicially compelled to disclose their 
                                                 
42 This does not require courts to ignore the more intrusive character of search warrants relative to other 
discovery processes. 
43 As to the need to distinguish between the special protection for news gatherer/ confidential source 
relationships and news gatherers’ work product see J. Randall, ‘Freeing Newsgathering from the 
Reporter’s Privilege’ 2005 The Yale Law Journal 1827; K. Larsen, ‘The Demise of the First 
Amendment-Based Reporter’s Privilege: Why This Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media’ 37 
Connecticut Law Review 1235 at 
http://www.connecticutlawreview.org/archive/vol37/summer/Larsen.pdf. (Last visited 5 April 2006) 
For recent discussions of protection for news gatherers’ work product specifically see A. Fargo, ‘The 
Journalists’ Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without Shields’ (2002) 7 Comm. L. 
and Pol’y 241; A. Heeger n 41 above.  
44 For an example of a news gatherer claiming the privilege against self incrimination as a ground for 
not disclosing the identity of a source see British Steel n 5.  For recent discussion of issues in this area 
see M. Feldstein, ‘The Jailing of a Journalist: Prosecuting the Press for Receiving Stolen Documents’ 
(2005) 10 Comm. L. & Pol’y 137; W. Lee, ‘The Unusual Suspects: Journalists as Thieves’ 8 Wm. & 
Mary Bill of Rts. J. 53 (1999). 
45 The possible alternatives are nicely illustrated by the differing conduct of the three appellants after In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above. 
46 That is, reasonable in terms of both breadth and compliance costs, as assessed for any other working 
individual or commercial premises.  All common law jurisdictions permit any affected person to resist 
orders or warrants on these grounds. 
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confidential sources’ identities.  Insisting upon a showing of (i) certain relevance, (ii) 
that all [reasonable] alternative means of learning the source’s identity have been 
attempted and failed and (iii) crucial significance of the identity of the source to the 
applicant/ party’s case amounts to special protection within this definition, at least 
where no onus of persuasion is placed upon the news gatherer,47 (no alternative 
protection) since requirements (ii) and (iii) are not normally prerequisites for 
subpoena, discovery or even search warrants, but such protection is of limited 
practical effect. 
 
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judge Tatel recognized that real protection for news 
gatherers’ confidential sources required the courts to consider, separately and in 
addition to the above criteria, “the two competing public interests … the public 
interest in compelling disclosure …the public interest in news gathering….”48 This 
could be done by simply taking the public interest in news gatherer/ source 
relationships into account as one relevant factor when exercising a judicial discretion 
(one relevant factor protection) but that would provide practical protection so weak it 
would hardly justify the epithet ‘special’.49  Judge Tatel, and many others, spoke of a 
balancing exercise between the competing public interests with individual judges to 
assign relative weights to each of these public interests largely unguided (at large 
balancing protection). At large balancing protection could be enhanced by express 
stipulation of a short exhaustive list of precisely defined public interests that may be 
balanced against the public interest in protecting news gatherer/ confidential source 
relationships.  Alternatively, protection could be in the form of legal or constitutional 
commands that all relevant decision makers must give (very) heavy weight to, or 
begin their assessment with a (very) strong presumption in favour of, the public 
interest in the protection of news gatherer/ confidential source relationships so that 
disclosure is possible only on a clear showing of a truly exceptional overriding public 
need for disclosure in the particular case (constitutional imperative or weighted 
balancing protection).  Constitutional imperative or weighted balancing protection 
could be further strengthened by stipulations of tightly defined circumstances in 
                                                 
47 For use or advocacy of this formulation for confidential sources see, for example, the shield laws of 
Georgia and the Carolinas re non parties, the cases Zerilli v Smith 656 F. 2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); The 
NYT Company v Alberto Gonzales, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States and 
The United States of America (unreported) USDC for SDNY, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2642 and the 
minority test in Branzburg n 41 above. The formulation is commonly used for work product and non 
confidential source material, for example, Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann. S 1459; Wen Ho Lee v United 
States Department of Justice, et al. 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12758 (DC App 2005); International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic Case 
No. IT-99-36-AR73.9 (ICTY Appeals Chamber 11th Dec. 2002). 
48 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 997-998. 
49 See, for example, National Roads and Motorists Association [NRMA] v John Fairfax Publications 
PTY Ltd [2002] NSWSC 563 (26 June 2002). 
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which an exceptional overriding public need for disclosure might (not must) be found, 
as where disclosure is necessary to prevent real risks of imminent physical harm 
(limited exception protection).50
 
Finally, protection could be in the form of an absolute prohibition on compelled or 
any disclosure (absolute protection). 
 
Can the protection be ‘waived’? 
Advocates of special protection speak fairly indiscriminately of a news gatherer’s 
right or privilege not to be compelled to disclose, or immunity against compelled 
disclosure of, the identity of the news gatherer’s confidential sources, prefaced by 
‘absolute’ or ‘qualified’, as appropriate.  Some refer to a source’s privilege or 
immunity.  This loose use of terminology is unfortunate. In the context of the law of 
evidence, that is, in the context of judicially compelled testimony or discovery, 
whether a right not to adduce evidence is classified as a privilege or an immunity 
matters.  The term ‘privilege’ refers to a right not to be compelled to disclose certain 
evidence. The person to whom the privilege belongs, such as a criminal defendant or a 
lawyer’s client, may invoke the privilege and refrain from testifying or disclosing the 
evidence or waive the privilege at their choice.  In modern times, ‘immunity’ is used 
for ‘public interest immunity’, the term adopted to replace ‘Crown privilege’ precisely 
because it was said that what was involved was not a privilege that belonged to the 
government but the public interest in nondisclosure of certain evidence and that the 
public interest, once established, can not be waived.51
 
If the special protection against judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of a 
news gatherer’s confidential source is a privilege, whose privilege is it, the news 
gatherer’s or the source’s?  However described, specific claims for special protection 
are almost always made by news gatherers – but do the news gatherers make the 
claim on their own or upon their sources’ behalf?  Where the claim is restricted to 
protection from judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of confidential sources 
only, the recent practice of seeking waivers from the source and then complying with 
the disclosure order if, but only if, the source agrees indicates a news gatherer’s belief 
that the power of waiver is with the source – a source’s privilege.52 This is consistent 
                                                 
50 W. E. Lee, ‘The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege’ (2006) 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. 
LJ 635, 684. 
51 Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388, 407.  See discussion in P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 9th ed. 2005), 399-401. 
52 For a detailed comparison between attorney-client privilege (as distinct from litigation or attorney 
work product privilege) and confidential source privilege and the power of the client/ source to waive 
that privilege see J. Randall n 43 above and see also Alaska Stat. ss 09.25.340, Oregon Rev. Stat. s 
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with a confidential source having a cause of action against the news gatherer for 
unauthorised disclosure,53 much as a client may sue a lawyer who breaches the 
client’s privilege.  Of course, the news gatherer would be obligated to continue to 
refuse to disclose until bona fide satisfied that any waiver reportedly made by the 
source was both informed and truly voluntary.  Both Cooper and Miller rejected as 
totally insufficient standard waivers from all White House administrative staff, signed 
under implicit threat of termination.  Waivers signed as a precondition to 
employment would be equally suspect. 
 
But recognition of this is a very different matter from saying that a news gatherer who 
is satisfied that a source wishes the news gatherer to testify can nevertheless invoke a 
news gatherers’ privilege against compelled disclosure and refuse to do so.  Do news 
gatherers make such a claim?54 Does any existing law recognize such a claim? 
 
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judge Tatel said that ‘…numerous cases … indicate 
that only reporters, not sources, may waive the privilege... [A] source’s waiver is 
irrelevant to the reasons for the privilege….the privilege belongs to the reporter.’55 
This was because the purpose of the privilege is the protection of news gathering, 
journalists understand the ‘imperatives of news gathering’ better than sources and 
journalists have an interest in promoting and protecting ‘news gatherer/ confidential 
source’ relationships generally, not merely the relationship with a particular source.56
 
However, Judge Tatel made these comments in the context of the special prosecutor’s 
reliance upon the signed waivers previously noted as ‘additional factors’ favouring 
compelling the news gatherers to testify.  Judge Tatel’s statements should be read in 
that context.  It is submitted that Judge Tatel did not mean to say that a person who 
was once a confidential source cannot choose to ‘out’ herself if she wishes – as Robin 
Ackroyd did – nor that a source’s genuine and voluntary wish that the news gatherer 
                                                                                                                                            
44.540, both shield laws that specifically provide for informant waiver only.  
53 Cohen v Cowles Media Co n 6 above.  
54 See Rachael Smolkin, ‘Waivering’ Feb/March 2006 Preview AJR at 
http://www.arj.org/article_printable.asp?id=4038 (Last visited 1 February 2006). Some of the news 
gatherers whose views are reported in the article did seem to go that far.  Their concern is for public 
confidence in news gatherer/ confidential source relationships generally.  The public would only see 
the news gatherer giving in – whether a waiver was coerced or genuine would not matter. 
55 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 999-1000. US state shield laws Ark. Code Ann. s16-85-510; 
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10 s 4325; Montana Code Ann. Section 26-1-903; Nevada Rev. Stat. s 49.385 do 
seem more consistent with a news gatherer’s privilege.  Other shield laws refer to a ‘reporter’s 
privilege’ but not in terms inconsistent with a source consent prerequisite for disclosure of identity. As 
to the protection of the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, similar to the HKSAR IGCO, 
Part XII discussed below, see R v Wayne Singleton [1995] 1 Cr App R 431, recognizing the news 
gatherer as the privilege holder. 
56 In re Grand Jury Subpoena note 9 above, 1000.  
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testify as to his identity and as to the content of their communications would be 
irrelevant in the context of even weighted balancing protection.  Did Judge Tatel 
mean that the news gatherer might choose (i) to invoke the privilege notwithstanding 
the source had made a less than totally satisfactory waiver or (ii) not to invoke the 
privilege in the face of a court order notwithstanding the source objected, in either 
case, provided the news gatherer considered the public interest so required?  This 
would make sense.  Then, in the former case, except where the privilege was seen as 
an absolute privilege – an option Judge Tatel rejected – it would be for the court to 
finally determine where the public interest truly lay.  The latter proposition would 
recognize the reality that no court would permit a source to obtain an injunction or 
damages against a news gatherer who chose to comply with a court order, irrespective 
of what the news gatherer’s professional body might say. 
 
This analysis suggests that the most appropriate analogy for protection against 
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of a news gatherer’s confidential source 
is the form of public interest immunity that protects the identity of law enforcement/ 
public security informants.  In Branzburg,57 Justice White rejected the analogy.  He 
noted that, if the authorities discovered the identity of a news gatherer’s source 
independently, neither the source’s reluctance nor the news gatherer’s objection would 
shield the source from a grand jury as it might shield the identity of a law enforcement 
informant or government agent – but a recent federal court decision has protected a 
news gatherer’s source from just such independent discovery, strongly supporting the 
analogy.58  White J also saw differences unfavourable to the news gatherers in the 
relative degree of public accountability, directly or through the courts, for the 
operation of the respective informant systems.  But in reality, both informant systems 
would be publicly accountable only when an appropriate case reaches the courts, 
although the fact that a news gatherer has used a confidential informant may be 
apparent well before that.59  There is also nothing in the point that police informants 
may be required to testify before a grand jury or in a criminal trial.  In the absence of 
absolute protection, an overriding public need for disclosure could prevail with 
respect to news gatherer sources as well.  In contrast, in Ashworth, Lord Woolf CJ 
                                                 
57 n 41 above, 695 – 698.  See also R v National Post et al (2005) 236 D.L.R. (4th) 551 at [69] per 
Benotto SJ, approving Branzburg and R. Pomerance, ‘Compelling the Message from the Medium: 
Media Search Warrants, Subpoenas and Production Orders’ (1997), 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 5, 24-26 to 
the same effect. 
58 NYT v Gonzales note 47 above but see the Patriot Act and P Scheer, ‘FBI Now Has Access To 
Journalists Phone Records’ June 2006 Coastal Post Online’ at 
http://www.coastalpost.com/o6/06/08.html, (Last visited 4 July 2006). 
59 In some cases, even before the news gatherer has published anything, as in Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 
EHRR 123 and In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above with respect to Miller. 
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noted substantial similarities between the two systems.60  
 
III AT COMMON LAW: THE JUDGES ALONE 
 
‘The newspaper rule’ 
In the late 19th century, the common law courts in England and elsewhere developed a 
rule of practice that, in defamation proceedings, pretrial discovery of documents or 
interrogatories would not be ordered against a newspaper so as to force it to disclose 
the name of a writer or a writer’s source(s) of information,61 at least if not partially 
disclosed in the article.62  The rule was extended to the broadcasting media,63 then to 
all defendants in defamation cases.64  It provides some practical protection to news 
gatherer/ confidential source relationships since many defamation cases do not come 
to trial.65  It has been applied in contempt proceedings to justify nondisclosure in 
disobedience of a court order.66  It has been used to defeat applications for Norwich 
Pharmacal type discovery orders in defamation cases.67  However attempts to 
extend the rule beyond defamation or pre trial procedures have invariably failed.68  
The rule may be in decline.69  
                                                 
60 Ashworth n 21 above at [61].  See also British Steel n 5 above, 1138-1139, per Watkins LJ in the 
CA. 
61 Hennessy v Wright (No 2) (1888) 24 QBD 445n ; Plymouth Mutual Co-operative and Industrial 
Society Limited v Traders’ Publishing Association Limited [1906] 1 KB 403, Re Bahamas Islands 
Reference [1893] AC 138, Lyle – Samuel v Odhams Ltd [1920] 1 KB 135; British Steel, n 5 above, 
John Fairfax and Sons v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 (HC); Hodder v Queensland Newspapers Pty 
Limited (1994) 1 Qd R 49 (QCA); Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries 
Ltd [1980] 1 NZLR 163; Shum v Eastweek Publisher Ltd [1994] 2 HKLR 381; cases referred to in 
Wasylyshen v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation et al 1989 CarswellSask 87 at 15] (Saskatchewan). 
62 See Cojuangco ibid at [25-26] in which the Australian High Court doubted the application to a 
publication in which sources had been partially identified as “senior American bank official and 
prominent local businessmen” and “one of the leading local US banks”, thereby deriving the benefit of 
a source’s status without incurring the risk of challenge but cf Hodder v Queensland Newspapers ibid. 
63 Cojuangco ibid at [10]; BCNZ v A.H. Industries n 61 above. 
64 British Steel n 5 above, 1199E per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton.  
65 G. Robertson QC, A. Nicol, Media Law (London: Penguin Books, 4th ed, 2002), 258. 
66 Re Bahamas Islands Reference n 61 above. 
67 BCNZ v A.H. Industries, n 61 above; Shum v Eastweek Publisher Ltd n 61 above.  In Australia, it is 
said that the policy behind the rule can be taken into account in pre-trial discovery decisions, 
Cojuangco n 61 above, Nagle v Chulov and Others [2001] NSWSC 9 and see D. Butler and S. Rodrick, 
Australian Media Law (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1999), 251 para 6.315. 
68 British Steel n 5 above, 1197; Cojuangco n 61 above, para 10; cf BCNZ v A.H. Industries n 61 above, 
in which the rule was extended by analogy to slander of title. 
69 Cojuangco n 61 above at [26-27]; Langley v The Age Company Ltd [2001] VSC 370; NRMA v John 
Fairfax n 49 above but cf Hodder v Queensland Newspapers n 61 above.  As to New Zealand, see 
High Court Rule 285 as amended in 2004, following recommendations in the New Zealand Law 
Commission Report 64 ‘Defaming Politicians – a Response to Lange v Atkinson’.  As to the Canadian 
decisions, see Wasylyshen, n 61 above and Rocca Enterprises Ltd v University Press of New Brunswick 
Ltd 103 N.B.R. (2d) 224 (New Brunswick).  Ouellette J.C.Q.B.A. sets out the history of the rule in 
Wasylyshen v Canadian Broadcasting Corp. 2005 CarswellAlta 1820 at [19 – 22] [39] concluding that 
while the ‘underlying rational [of the Newspaper Rule] remains relevant, in light of the clear 
applicability of the Wigmore principles and s. 2(b) of the Charter, the strict application of the 
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Is there a common law rule that news gatherers can not be judicially compelled to 
disclose their confidential sources? 
English and Australian courts have consistently denied the existence of a common law 
rule prohibiting judges from compelling news gatherers to disclose their sources,70 
but have accepted the public interest in the protection of news gatherer/ confidential 
sources as a factor to be taken into account when exercising search warrant, subpoena, 
and discovery discretions – the relevant factor approach noted above but without a 
formal proof of exhaustion of alternative sources prerequisite.71  
 
At US federal level, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judge Sentelle said that the 
Supreme Court decided in Branzburg,72 a decision he found binding on his court,73 
that there was no federal common law privilege protecting reporters from judicial 
compulsion to reveal their confidential sources before a grand jury.  Nor would 
Judge Sentelle have chosen to create such a privilege under Rule 50174 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence had he felt free to do so, which he did not.75 A news gatherer 
would always have access to a court on a motion to quash any process on grounds of 
bad faith or irrelevance – but so would all citizens. 
 
Judge Tatel said that Branzburg had not decided the point.76 Applying the standard in 
                                                                                                                                            
Newspaper Rule becomes less important.’ 
70 British Steel n 5 above; A-G v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773 (CA); AG v Mullholland [1963] 2 QB 477 
(CA); Attorney General v Jack Lundin (1982) 75 Cr App R 90; McGuinness v Attorney-General of 
Victoria (1940) 63 CLR 73 (HCt Aust). This position is also accepted as the common law in Hong 
Kong; see Shum v Eastweek Publisher Limited, n 61 above. 
71 British Steel n 5 above, 1174F-1175C per Lord Wilberforce; Lundin ibid and Y. Cripps, The Legal 
Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest: An Analysis of Prohibitions and Protections with 
Particular Reference to Employers and Employees (London: Sweet and Maxell, 2nd ed, 1994) 280-281; 
Cojuangco n 61 above at [22].  As to the rejection of a ‘no alternative’ precondition but recognition of 
failure to attempt to use alternatives as a significant – even decisive - factor in deciding whether 
disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice, see John & Others v Express Newspapers Limited and 
Others [2000] E.M.L.R. 606, 616; Specialist Hospital Service Authority v Hyde (1994) 20 B.M.L.R. 75; 
Hodder v Queensland Newspapers n 61 above.  Cf NSW S Ct Rules Part 3 r 1 which requires proof of 
reasonable enquiries as a threshold condition for a source disclosure order under that provision, see 
NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 above at [24-36]; Nagle v Chulov n 67 above at [39-42]. 
72 n 41 above. 
73 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 977. 
74 Rule 501: ‘Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act 
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of 
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light 
of reason and experience ….’ Effective 1 July 1975.  See T. Campagnolo, ‘The Conflict between State 
Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues’ (2003) 38 Gonzaga L. Rev. 
445. 
75 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 978. 
76 Judge Henderson agreed, ibid, 983 but declined to consider the merits since on any form of privilege 
acceptable to the court, all agreed the Special Counsel’s evidence defeated it, ibid, 982.  
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Rule 501, Judge Tatel was confident that ‘reason and experience’ ‘dictate a privilege 
for reporters’ confidential sources – albeit a qualified one.’77  He reasoned that 
compelling news gatherers to identify a source might ‘significantly interfere’ with a 
method of news gathering crucial to the generation of important stories, thereby 
weakening a vital source of information, leaving citizens ‘far less able to make 
informed political, social and economic choices’ but yielding minimal evidentiary 
benefit since, in the absence of a privilege, much of the evidence desired by litigants 
or the state was unlikely to be forthcoming.78  What the context of grand jury 
investigations required then was a balancing of the public interest in the free flow of 
information and the public interest in law enforcement in each case. 
 
In the Miller/ Cooper case, having examined the record, Judge Tatel was satisfied that 
the information released by the news gatherers’ sources was more harmful than 
newsworthy,79 and hence the public interest in law enforcement was the stronger.  
No privilege barred the subpoenas in that case.80 The Judge was also satisfied that the 
special counsel had established the standard necessity and exhaustion of alternative 
source prerequisites,81 so the orders to testify ought to be affirmed. 
 
At state level, in In re Grand Jury subpoena Judge Tatel said that eighteen states had 
common law based protection for news gatherers’ sources.82 In NYT v Gonzales, 
Sweet DJ listed seventeen states in which judges had recognized such protection.83 
Some judges, whilst denying the existence of a privilege, have nevertheless spoken of 
a balancing of interests but with the news gatherer bearing the burden of establishing 
the need to protect the confidence notwithstanding established relevance.84
   
                                                 
77 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 989.  As to the legislative intent of Rule 501 see also C. 
Wright & K. Graham 23 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. ch 6 ‘Privileges: Rule 501’ at nn 198-199. 
78 A summary of Judge Tatel’s arguments at n 9 above, 991-992. Sweet DJ in NYT v Gonzales n 47 
above follows a similar path. 
79 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 1001-1002.  Part of the judge’s analysis of the record dealing 
with disclosures made by the Special Prosecutor was redacted in the published report. 
80 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 1003. 
81 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 1002, 1004. 
82 n 9 above, 994. 
83 n 47 above, 133-135. The states listed were Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin at 
appellate level, Connecticut, Mississippi and Utah at lower court level.  Note that these are all 
non-shield states.  As to state shield laws, see below.  For general discussions as to how the states 
have applied both common law and shield based privileges see R. Eclavea, ‘Privilege of News Gatherer 
Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources or Information’ 99 ALR 3d 37 s 3; R. Holsinger & J. P. 
Dilts, Media Law (New York: McGraw Hill Companies Inc, 4th ed, 1997), 341-356. 
84 Matter of Roche 381 Mass. 624, 636 quoting Herbert v Lando 441 U.S. 153, Powell J concurring, in 
turn cited with approval in Edward Wojcik and another v Boston Herald Inc and others 60 Mass App 
Ct. 510; Mass. App LEXIS 213; In re Grand Jury Proceedings 810 F 2d 580, 585-586 (6th Circuit 
1987), recently followed in In re Daimler Chrysler AG Securities Litigation 216 F.R.D. 395. 
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Canadian common law discourse in this area is increasingly intertwined with Charter 
discourse.  Both are considered together below.  
 




In the absence of a bill of rights, the High Court has found an implied constitutional 
‘freedom of communication between the people concerning political or government 
matters which enables the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors…’ 
but no Australian court has yet accepted this as requiring special protection for news 
gatherers’ sources.85 In NSW, sections 126A and 126B of the Evidence Act provide a 
form of ‘one relevant factor’ protection for confidential sources, including those of 
professional journalists. The test is whether disclosure is necessary in the [paramount] 
interests of justice, the British Steel test at common law.86
 
Canada 
Canadian courts have rejected general protection from judicially compelled disclosure 
for news gatherers’ sources but accept the constitutional role of the press as a factor to 
be considered when exercising any necessary discretion.87  Some Canadian courts 
have recently accepted a case-by-case approach in this context with a starting point of 
no special protection for news gatherers’ confidential sources but permitting the need 
for protection in the form of a privilege to be established for a particular source in a 
particular case – that is, a form of at large balancing protection but with the onus of 
proof on the news gatherer.88 A modified version of Wigmore’s criteria for the 
development of a privilege is being used.89 Recent case law suggests the practical 
                                                 
85 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560; NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 
above, [119 – 144]; Nagle v Chulov n 67 above [74-104]. 
86 NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 above, [168].  The court accepted this approach to protection was more 
restrictive than that in Ashworth n 21 above.  See also Nagle v Chulov ibid. 
87 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v New Brunswick Attorney General [1991] 3 S.C.R 459; 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Lessard [1991] 3 SCR 421, paras 14 -15 per Cory J; Pomerance 
n 57 above; C. McNeill, ‘Search and Seizure of the Press’ (1996) 34 Osgoode Law Journal 175. 
88 Slavutch v Baker [1976] 1 S.C. R. 254, 260; Moysa v Labour Relations Board et al [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1572, para 5; R v McClure [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445. 
89 Wigmore’s four criteria were summarized by McLachlin CJ in M. (A.) v. Ryan (1996), 143 D.L.R. 
(4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [para 20], quoted in National Post n 57 above, [56], as follows: ‘First, the 
communication must originate in a confidence [that the identity of the informant will not be disclosed]. 
Second, the confidence must be essential to the relationship in which the communication arises. Third, 
the relationship must be one which should be "sedulously fostered" in the public good. Finally, if all these 
requirements are met, the court must consider whether the interests served by protecting the 
communications from disclosure outweigh the interest in getting at the truth and disposing correctly of 
the litigation.’  The words in brackets are modifications necessary to accommodate disclosure of 
sources.  Note also L’Heureux-dube J’s observation in R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263 that Professor 
Wigmore intended these criteria to be used to identify new category or class privileges, not 
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implications of this are still being worked out.90
 
USA 
The First Amendment91 of the Constitution of the United States of America 
The court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena rejected Miller’s and Cooper’s claims of First 
Amendment protection against judicially compelled disclosure of news gatherers’ 
confidential sources to a grand jury, holding that in Branzburg,92 the US Supreme 
Court specifically denied the existence of such a privilege on facts ‘materially 
indistinguishable’ from those in the present cases.93 In reaching this decision, Judges 
Sentelle and Henderson emphatically rejected oft repeated arguments that Justice 
Powell, in his concurring Branzburg opinion, intended to hold otherwise.94 Judge 
Tatel was ‘uncertain that Branzburg offers “no support” for a constitutional reporter 
privilege in the grand jury context’95 but concluded that the Court’s own previous 
decisions applying Branzburg in the context of good faith criminal investigations 
were binding and determinative.96
                                                                                                                                            
case-by-case ones. 
90 Compare Bouaziz v Ouston 2002 Carswell BC 2041, a standard discovery application, in which the 
judge said that on the basis of BC precedent he was bound to conclude that “[i]n weighing the 
competing interests, it is the public interest in correctly decided litigation which prevails…” and R v 
National Post, ibid in which the judge adopted a pro protection of sources approach in reaching a 
decision to quash a search warrant and assistance order.  Like Bouaziz, Emmet Reidy v Leader Star 
News Services and others 2003 CarswellSask 540 and St Elizabeth Home Security (Hamilton, Ont) v 
City of Hamilton et al., (unreported, decision of Justice Crane dated December 1 and 2, 2004), the 
latter noted in Paul Schabas, Ryder Gilliland ‘The Media, Open Courts and Sealing Orders: Recent 
Developments’ (2005) 17 Nat’l J. Const. Law 105 give very little weight to news gathering protection. 
In contrast, R v National Post was cited in Wasylyshen 2005 n 69 above and In the Matter of Ernst 
Zundel 2004 CarswellNat 1904 as having affirmed the existence of a common law privilege although 
the actual approach adopted by the judge in the latter case followed R v Hughes [1998] B.C. J. No 1694, 
suggesting a form of relevant factor protection. 
91 “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, of the press ….” 
92 n 41 above. 
93 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 968 – 972, 988. For a reading of Branzburg similar to that of 
Sentelle CJ see United States v Smith 135 F. 3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings n 
84 above, 584-85, the latter noted by Judge Tatel at ibid, 988.  The ‘indistinguishable material facts’ 
included: news gatherers had witnessed the confidential source committing crimes or had received 
knowledge from the source of the [possible] commission of crimes by the source or others; the demand 
was made for appearance before a grand jury investigating the possible commission of these or related 
criminal offences. 
94 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 970-972.  As to the oft repeated argument, see Holsinger & 
Dilts n 83 above, 319-325; Larsen, ‘The Demise of the First Amendment-Based Reporter’s Privilege’ n 
43 above; NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 73 – 100 and see McKevitt v Pallasch 339 F 3d 530 (7th Cir. 
2003) and Michael B. Price v Time Inc., Don Yaeger 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 14331 (11 Cir 2005), 
finding no privilege for non confidential material and First Amendment based ‘no alternative 
protection’ for confidential sources respectively. 
95 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 987.  News gatherers do tend to lose even confidential 
source cases in grand jury investigations at state and federal level, although there have been some 
successes: Holsinger & Dilts n 83 above, 341-343; D. Pember, Mass Media Law (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2000), 372-373; D. Scardino, ‘Vanessa Leggett Serves Maximum Jail 
Time’ (2002) 19 Comm. Law. 1. 
96 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 988 citing Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v 
AT & T 192 U.S. App. D.C. 593 F. 2d. 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), In re Possible Violations of 18 USC 371, 
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Away from grand jury investigations, Judge Tatel noted with approval four federal 
appellate decisions that had found First Amendment protection against compelled 
disclosure of news gatherers’ confidential sources in civil cases97 and three finding a 
qualified constitutional protection in a criminal case.98  Judge Sentelle was 
unenthusiastic.99
 
This divergence of views as to the meaning and breadth of Branzburg is of long 
standing and widespread.100 The Supreme Court’s refusal of certiorari in the Miller 
case may indicate the conservative interpretation is gaining ground.101  
 
US shield legislation 
The term ‘shield legislation’ refers to laws purporting to provide special protection for 
news gatherers against judicially compelled disclosure. As of September 30, 2005, 31 
US state legislatures and the District of Columbia had shield laws,102 18 of which give 
                                                                                                                                            
641, 1503, 184 U.S. App. D.C. 82, 564 F. 2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
97 Carey v Hume 169 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Zerilli v Smith n 47 above; 
Bruno & Stillman, Inc v Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F. 2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Silkwood v Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 563 F. 2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). 
98 United States v LaRouche Campaign 841 F. 2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v Burke 700 F 2d 
70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v Ahn 343 U.S. App. D.C. 392, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For a 
general discussion of First Amendment based protection cases see Holsinger & Dilts n 83 above, 325 – 
331; Pember n 95 above, 365-373 and see NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 131 in which Sweet DJ notes 
that California’s Constitution included specific protection for news gatherer sources and courts in 
Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New York and Oklahoma have interpreted federal or state constitutions 
as providing news gatherer source protection. 
99 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 972.  See also Judge Sentelle’s comments about Zerilli v 
Smith n 47 above in Wen Ho Lee n 47 above, 11-12. 
100 D. Scardino, n 95 above; H. Stamp, ‘McKevitt v Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the Branzburg 
Decision are Haunting Journalists in the Seventh Circuit’ (2004) 14 DePaul-LCA J Art & Ent. L 363.  
Even McKevitt has been variously interpreted; see Madison Hobley v Chicago Police Commissioner 
Jon Burge et al 223 F.R.D. 499 (2004). 
101 A. Liptak, ‘Courts Grow Increasingly Skeptical of Any Special Protections for the Press’ 28 June 
2005, New York Times, accessed http://www.nytimes.com. (Last visited 25 October 2005); Larsen, ‘The 
Demise of the First Amendment’ n 43 above.  The US Supreme Court has also declined to hear 
reporters’ appeals in the Wen Ho Lee case, n 47 above, see W. Richey, ‘No relief for reporters seeking 
to shield sources’ 6 June 2006 The Christian Science Monitor at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0606/p02s01-usju.html.  
102 Details of all these provisions are conveniently assembled in C. Lening & H. Cohen, Journalists’ 
Privilege to Withhold Information in Judicial and Other Proceedings: State Shield Statutes (8 March 
2005), a Congressional Research Service Report, and ‘The Reporter’s Privilege’ (Dec 2002) posted by 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at www.rcfp.org. (Last visited 25 October 2005).  
See also NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 130-131; Holsinger & Dilts n 83 above, 331-334. The states 
without shield legislation are Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Of these, only Hawaii and Wyoming do not recognize a 
common law or First Amendment based journalist’s privilege of any kind. There are currently at least 
two bills attempting to enact a federal shield law, The Free Flow of Information Act of 2006 (S.B. 
2831), in effect superseding Lugar (S 340) (reintroduced as S. 1419) and the Dodd bill (S. 369), and 
H.R. 3323 (the Pence bill), the latter of which would provide an absolute privilege for confidential 
sources, see Special Report: ‘Reporters and Federal Subpoenas’ at The Reporters Committee for 
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absolute103 or near absolute protection to a variable range of confidential sources.104 
The qualified shields generally restrict disclosure unless found to be in the public 
interest105 or if certain types of criminal offence or defamation are involved106 or 




These are non binding guidelines issued by the then US Attorney General’s Office in 
1973, requiring officials to exercise restraint in seeking subpoenas against the 
media.109  
 
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
The Federal Privacy Protection Act of 1980,110 passed in response to Zurcher v The 
Stanford Daily111 and applicable to law enforcement authorities throughout the United 
States, limits the use of search warrants to obtain news gatherers’ work product or 
confidential documents to a narrowly defined range of circumstances, including 
‘suspicion news gatherer has committed a criminal offense’,112 ‘reason to believe 
immediate seizure is necessary to prevent death or serious injury to a human being’ or 
non compliance with a subpoena.  Some states have additional provisions.113
 
Hong Kong, the Basic Law and IGCO ss 83-89 (Part XIII) 
                                                                                                                                            
Freedom of the Press at www.rcfp.org (Last visited 4 July 2006). 
103 But as to Pennsylvania, see Castellani v The Scranton Times, noted in ‘Judge creates exception to 
state’s absolute shield law’ http://www.rcfp.org/news/2005/0609-con-judgec.html (Last visited 4 July 
2006).  The decision is being appealed. 
104 Alabama, Arkansas, DC, Delaware, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey (not grand juries), New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania.    
105 Alaska, Illinois for libel and slander, Louisiana, New Mexico (necessary to prevent injustice), North 
Dakota (miscarriage of justice). 
106 Colorado, Illinois (subject to secrecy laws), Minnesota for defamation if actual malice is alleged; 
Rhode Island (not grand jury and not re specific felony, threat to human life, defamation if source based 
defence). 
107 Colorado, Florida Georgia, Illinois, Michigan re crime punishable by imprisonment for life, 
Minnesota for felonies and misdemeanors, North and South Carolina, New Jersey for criminal 
defendants, Oklahoma and Tennessee except defamation where source based defence. 
108 Neb. Rev. Stat paras 20-144 to 147, Del Code Ann. Tit. 10, paras 4320-4326 are exceptions. In Price 
v Yaeger n 94 above, the court held that the Alabama absolute shield law stipulated ‘newspaper, radio 
broadcasting station or television station’ and so did not apply to a magazine. 
109 28 CFR 50.10.  These are quoted by Judge Sentelle in In re Grand Jury Application n 9 above, 975.  
See A. Liptak, ‘Panel Two: Media and Law Enforcement: The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the 
Justice Department’s Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press’ 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 227. 
110 42 USC para 2000aa. 
111 436 US 547 (1978). 
112 Not an offence that consists of ‘the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of’ the 
materials sought or the information contained in those materials.  The Hong Kong warrants would 
appear to be within this restriction. 
113 New Jersey Stat. Ann. paras 2A:84A-21.9; Or. Rev. Stat. paras 44.520(2). 
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Article 23 of the HKSAR Basic Law provides that ‘Hong Kong residents shall have 
freedom of speech, of the press and of publication….’114 It was referred to at all levels 
in the Sing Tao litigation. Part XII of IGCO115, enacted in 1995, was at the centre of 
that litigation.  Part XII is a modified form of Part II of the English Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).  There are four significant differences.  First, 
Part XII applies equally to all journalistic material,116 PACE Part II puts excluded 
journalistic material (confidential documents and records)117 outside the scope of a 
PACE search warrant.118 Second, only Part XII provides for automatic three day 
sealing of journalistic material obtained using a search warrant.119 Under section 87, a 
news gatherer or owner who applies will get the material back unopened ‘unless the 
judge is satisfied’ the use of the journalistic material ‘in the investigation’ would be in 
the public interest.120 Third, Part XII, section 89(2) provides that ‘nothing in this Part 
shall be construed as requiring a judge to make an order under this Part where he 
considers that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be in the public 
interest to make that order.’  PACE has no comparable provision.121 Finally, Part XII 
provides that a production order/122 warrant may be issued where there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the material sought is likely to be (A) of substantial value 
to the investigation of the arrestable offence OR (B) relevant evidence in proceedings 
for the arrestable offence.  In PACE, these conditions are cumulative.123
 
                                                 
114 Article 39 of the HKSAR Basic Law provides that the ICCPR, as applied to Hong Kong, shall apply 
in the HKSAR and that rights and freedoms shall not be restricted in any way that contravenes the 
ICCPR.  The terms of the ICCPR are substantially reproduced in the HKSAR Bill of Rights. 
115 See also Rules of the High Court Order 118. 
116 ‘Journalistic material’ is defined in section 82 as ‘any material acquired or created for the purposes 
of journalism’, provided it remains ‘in the possession of a person who acquired or created it’ for those 
purposes.  A person who ‘receives material from someone who intends that the recipient shall use it 
for the purposes of journalism’ has ‘acquired it for those purposes.’ 
117 PACE s 11(1)(c). 
118 Unless a production order issued under some other legislation, such as terrorist legislation, had not 
been complied with, see PACE ss. 8, 9 and Schedule 1 ss 4, 12.  Hence, the Hong Kong warrants 
could not have been issued in England. 
119 S 85(6) but subject to s 85(7), that is, ‘where the judge is satisfied that there may be serious 
prejudice to the investigation if the applicant is not permitted to have immediate access to the material.’  
The material seized from Sing Tao and the other papers was sealed in this way.   
120 Ss 85(6) and 87 but only for sealed material. 
121 cf R v Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright [2001] 1 WLR 662 in which the English Court of 
Appeal said that deciding whether to make a disclosure order under s 9 and Sch 1 of PACE required the 
judge to consider, amongst other things, fundamental principles relating to the position of the press in a 
liberal democracy.  The same reasoning might apply to search warrants.   
122 Part XII s 84 provides an inter partes procedure for production orders. Failure to comply with such 
orders is an offence punishable by a level 6 fine and imprisonment for 1 year, s 84(5) and is also a 
separate ground for issuing a search warrant.  The PACE equivalent is the preferred procedure in 
England but the production order procedure has not been used in HK, see M. N. Yan., ‘Search Warrant 
Versus Production Order – the Hong Kong Experience in Protection of Journalists’ Material’ (2005) 10 
Media and Arts L. Rev. 117, 121, 125-126. 
123 IGCO Sections 84(2)(iii), 85(3)(a)(i); PACE sections 8(1), 9(1) and schedule 1, section 2 
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Part XII Section 85 provides an ex parte procedure for the issuing of search 
warrants124 by a Court of First Instance judge125 where conditions similar to those 
required for a production order are fulfilled126 and one of 3 additional limiting 
conditions apply, namely: (a) it is not practicable to communicate with anyone 
entitled to grant entry; (b) it is not practicable to communicate with anyone entitled to 
grant access to the material; (c) service of notice of the application might seriously 
prejudice the investigation.127
 
In the court below, Hartman J said that the scheme contained in Part XII ss 83-89 of 
IGCO had to be ‘viewed through the prism’ of Article 27 of the HKSAR Basic 
Law.128  In the Court of Appeal, Ma CJHC criticized this position, saying:129
This is apt to confuse…. If … what was meant was that in approaching 
Part XII applications, there should be a bias in favour of this basic 
freedom [of the press] and to regard that as some sort of paramount 
consideration, I would disagree.  As I have earlier said, Part XII at the 
same time emphasizes the freedom of the press as well as fixes the 
limits to it.  Part XII itself contains important safeguards to protect 
the basic freedom, safeguards which journalists alone enjoy in Hong 
Kong….  There are, however, limits to it.  If there is any paramount 
consideration at all, it is the public interest…. The public interest 
referred to in sections 87(2) and 89(2) … requires the Court to consider 
all aspects of any given case, with no bias or predisposition towards 
any particular factor. Often, a balancing exercise between competing 
interests is involved…The balancing exercise that Part XII focuses on 
is the freedom of the press seen against the need effectively to 
investigate and deal with crime. 
 
This is at best ‘at large balancing’ protection.  In that balancing, Ma CJHC 
                                                 
124 The warrant issuing powers, rather than the procedure, are created by common law or other 
legislation. 
125 The judges who preside over the highest level trial court in Hong Kong. 
126 The omission of condition (vi)(b) is explained by the inclusion of  ‘The circumstances under which 
the material was being held at the time of its seizure’ as one of the factors a judge must have regard to 
in deciding whether disclosure of sealed material is in the public interest under s 87(2). 
127 This was the condition relied on by the ICAC, who feared the journalists might inadvertently tip off 
their real targets. 
128 Sing Tao (Hartmann J) n 30 above at [46]. 
129 Sing Tao n 28 above at [43].  Ma CJCH quoted the extremely conservative decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Att Gen for New Brunswick n 87 
above, 556-557 in support of this position.  As to the revealing character of the court’s choice of 
foreign jurisprudence, see A.Li & A. Lui, ‘Search and Seizure of Journalistic Material: The Sing Tao 
Daily Case’ (2005) 35 H.K.L.J. 69. 
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emphasized the limitations on the freedom of the press130 before concluding that the 
freedom of the press in that case had to be seen against the fact that ‘serious crimes 
may well have been committed, one in which the [news gatherers] … have been 
caught up; the other in respect of which there is prima facie evidence against the 
[news gatherers] themselves.’131
 
England and the European Convention on Human Rights 
As to subpoenas and discovery,132 it is necessary to discuss section 10 of the 
Contempt Act 1981133  
Section 10: 
 No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt  
 of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a  
publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the 
satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or  
national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.134
 
Enacted in response to the House of Lords decision in British Steel,135 judicial 
interpretation of this section deserves careful attention. Discussion is in three parts: 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision in Goodwin, Goodwin 
itself, and after the HRA. 
 
Before Goodwin 
Lord Scarman said that section 10 replaced the common law’s judicial discretion not 
                                                 
130 See Yan n 122 above for a strong critique of this aspect of the judgment. 
131 Sing Tao n 28 above at [49]. Yan ibid puts the journalists’ point of view. 
132 For search warrants, see the discussion of the IGCO Part XII above. 
133 See generally Cripps note 71 above, 281 – 293; Robertson & Nicol n 66 above, 260 – 268; M. 
Tugendhat QC and I. Christie, The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2002), 571 – 591; S. Spilsbury, Media Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000), 397. 
134 Cases applying this section directly or by analogy include: Ackroyd (2) n 24 above*; Ackroyd (1) n 
26 above*; Ashworth n 21 above; Financial Times Ltd. & Ors v Interbrew SA [2002] EWCA Civ 274; 
Reavey & Ors v Century Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2001] NIQB 17*; Totalise Plc v The Motley Fool 
Ltd n 40 above*; John and Others v Express Newspapers Limited and Others n 71 above*; Gaddafi v 
Daily Telegraph [2000] E.M.L.R. 431*; Camelot Group Plc v Centaur Communications Ltd [1999] QB 
124 (CA); Saunders v Punch Limited [1998] E.M.L.R.18*; Michael O’Mara Books Ltd v Express 
Newspapers [1998] E.M.L.R 383; Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary and Another v 
Garavelli [1997] E.M.L.R. 543 (DC)*; Goodwin n 59 above;* Essex C.C. v Mirror Group Newspaper 
Limited [1996] 1 F.L.R. 585*; Special Hospital Services Authority v Hyde n 71 above*; Maastricht 
Referendum Campaign v Hounam May 28 1993 (unreported)*; X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) 
Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1; In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] 
AC 660; X Health Authority v Y [1988] R.P.C. 379 (QB); Maxwell v Pressdram Ltd and Another [1987] 
1 WLR 298; Handmade Films (Productions) Limited v Express Newspapers Plc [1986] F.S.R. 463 (Ch 
D); Secretary of State for Defence and Another (Respondents) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 
339. (* indicates the decision was in favour of the news gatherer.) 
135 See Financial Times Ltd v Interbrew S.A, ibid, [7] per Lord Justice Sedley; Cripps n 71 above, 
295-296; Tugendhat & Christie n 133 above, 571-572. 
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to compel disclosure of a news gatherer’s confidential source (relevant factor 
protection) with a rule of law prohibiting such disclosure unless the applicant for 
disclosure could prove one of the stipulated exceptions (weighted balance plus limited 
exception protection). He thought the change to be ‘of profound significance’.136   
 
Once the prerequisites for some existing disclosure process have been established,137 
the section provides special protection against the making of, or punishment for non 
compliance with, any form of court order for disclosure of a relevant source, whether 
pre trial or in trial, civil or criminal.138 Application to search warrants is limited.139  
The section applies to orders to disclose material that will, or reasonably might, 
directly or indirectly identify a source or which is sought for that purpose140 and 
notwithstanding the requesting party’s proprietary interest or other right of return in 
that material.141 It extends protection to ‘any person responsible for a publication’142 
and sources of information ‘communicated and received for the purposes of 
publication’, published or not.143
 
If the section applies, a court has no power to order disclosure, or punish for 
nondisclosure, unless the party seeking disclosure satisfies the court that it is 
‘necessary’ for one of the listed interests. ‘[N]ecessary’ means “really needed”.144 In 
Morgan-Grampian, Lords Bridge and Oliver said a balancing process is required 
between the public interest in the free flow of information and consequential 
protection of news gatherers’ sources on the one hand and the stipulated competing 
interests on the other, with full weight given to the statutory privilege – perhaps a 
weak form of weighted balancing.145
                                                 
136 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers n 134 above, 361.  See to the same effect 
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Morgan-Grampian n 134 above, 51-53. 
137 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers ibid, 347 per Lord Diplock; Ashworth n 21 
above at [41] per Lord Woolf. 
138 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers ibid, 349 per Lord Diplock. 
139 Tugendhat & Christie n 133 above, 597 at [14.67]. 
140 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers n 134 above, 349 per Lord Diplock, 363 per 
Lord Scarman.  The UK government enacted s 8 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, creating specific 
offences of failing to comply with an official direction to return specified government documentary 
property in response to this argument, see Cripps n 71 above, 285. 
141 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers ibid.  All members of the HL agreed on this 
point. 
142 Cripps n 71 above, 281-282. A ‘publication’, defined in s 2, includes ‘any speech, writing, 
programme included in a service or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the 
public at large or any section of the public’. 
143 Morgan Grampian n 134 above, 40 per Lord Bridge. 
144 ibid, 42 per Lord Bridge quoting Lord Griffiths in In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 n 134 above, 704; 53 per Lord Oliver. Cf Murphy n 51 above, 465 at which 
he said, ‘With respect, it may be doubted whether this definition does any more than reduce somewhat 
the standard enacted by Parliament.’ 
145 ibid, 41-43 per Lord Bridge; 53 per Lord Oliver.  Lord Oliver suggested that if the applicant was 
 24
 
The exceptions in Section 10 have been expansively interpreted.146 Of the ‘interests of 
justice’, the phrase used in the determinative tests in British Steel and Australian cases, 
Lord Oliver stated in Morgan-Grampian, “[t]he interest of the public in the 
administration of justice must…embrace its interest in the maintenance of a system of 
law, within the framework of which every citizen has the ability and the freedom to 
exercise his legal right to remedy a wrong done to him or to prevent it being done, 
whether or not through the medium of legal proceedings.”147 The example given was 
an employer who seeks the identity of a disloyal employee in order to terminate the 
employee’s contract only.148 But an applicant who could not take effective action to 
protect her rights without knowing the identity of the source still might not win.  
What was at stake for the party seeking disclosure, the degree of legitimate public 
interest in the information provided by the source and the legitimacy or otherwise of 
the means used by the source to obtain the information would also be relevant.149  
As Cripps observed, this was ‘very reminiscent’ of British Steel reasoning as well as 
language.150 It is ‘at large balancing’ at best.  As interpreted by the HL alone, section 
10 would make very little difference. 
 
Not surprisingly, the House of Lords unanimously upheld a judicial order that 
Morgan-Grampian’s employee, journalist Goodwin, deliver up his notes concerning 
his conversation with an anonymous source.151  The source had disclosed a draft 
business/financial plan of X Co, the premature release of which could have caused 
serious economic damage to X Co had it not been prevented by a timely injunction.   
 
Goodwin v United Kingdom152
At the ECHR, the issue was whether the admitted interference with Goodwin’s article 
10(1) right of freedom of expression by reason of the disclosure order and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                            
successful in displacing the prohibition, the court would still have to decide, as a matter of discretion, 
whether to issue the relevant process, as it does with respect to every applicant, ibid, 51-52. 
146 As to the prevention of crime, see In re an Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Act 1985 n 134 above. 
147 Morgan Grampian n 134 above, 54 and see 43 per Lord Bridge to like effect.  
148 ibid, 43 per Lord Bridge; 54 per Lord Oliver. 
149 ibid, 44 per Lord Bridge. 
150 Cripps n 71 above, 291 and see argument at 297 - 299. Lord Templeman’s judgment in Morgan 
Grampian ibid, 49-50 reads exactly like a restrictive common law judgment, just as if section 10 had not been 
enacted at all and see S. Palmer, ‘Protecting Journalists’ Sources: Section 10, Contempt of Court Act 1981’ [1992] 
P.L. 61, 70-71. 
151 n 134 above, 44-45 per Lord Bridge emphasizing the source’s complicity in a ‘gross breach of 
confidentiality.’  See also Lord Oliver n 134 above, 54 but without any mention of the source’s 
probable wrongdoing. 
152 n 59 above. 
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conviction for contempt153 was justified under article 10(2) of the European 
Convention.154  Section 10 of the Contempt Act 1981, as interpreted by the House of 
Lords in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian Ltd, was found to be sufficiently certain within 
the meaning of ‘prescribed by law’.155  The protection of X Co’s legal rights was a 
legitimate aim of the legislation.156 As to whether the specific interference was 
necessary in a democratic society, the ECHR reasoned as follows: 
(i) ‘[F]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society … the safeguards to be afforded to the press are of 
particular importance.’157 
(ii) ‘Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom…. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from 
assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest… 
[possibly undermining the] vital public-watchdog role of the press … [and 
adversely affecting] the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable 
information.’158 
(iii) An order compelling disclosure or punishing journalists for disobedience 
to such an order could not, therefore, be compatible with article 10 ‘unless 
[the order] is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.’ 
(iv) ‘[T]he “necessity” for any restriction on freedom of expression in a 
democratic society must be convincingly established….’  There must be 
‘a pressing social need for the restriction’ and the restriction must be 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.  The states’ normal margin 
of appreciation is here ‘circumscribed by the interest of democratic society 
in ensuring and maintaining a free press.’  ‘[L]imitations on the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by 
the court.’  The reasons for the restriction must be ‘relevant and 
sufficient’.159 
(v) The balancing approach and the ‘interests of justice’ exception did not 
                                                 
153 ibid at [28].  Article 10(1) in relevant part provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression.  This right shall include freedom … to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority….’ 
154 Article 10(2) provides: ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
155 Goodwin n 59 above at [29 – 34]. 
156 ibid at [35]. 
157 ibid at [39]. 
158 ibid at [39].  These propositions were accepted without the need for empirical proof. 
159 ibid at [40]. 
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make the law arbitrary.160 
(vi) On the facts, since the Court of Appeal had found the injunction against 
publication that had been granted to X Ltd ‘was effective in stopping 
dissemination of the confidential information by the press’, thereby largely 
neutralizing the threat of economic harm, heavily relied upon by Lord 
Bridge, the interference could not be supported by the House of Lords’ 
reasons.161 
(vii) Given that Article 10 ‘tip[s] the balance of competing interests in favour of 
the interest of democratic society in securing a free press…’, other stated 
purposes including enabling X Co to unmask a disloyal employee, though 
legitimate, did not, even cumulatively, amount to an overriding 
requirement for disclosure in the public interest.162 
This was strong constitutional imperative/ weighted balancing protection. The ECHR 
mentioned Goodwin with approval in In the case of Fressoz and Roire v France163 
and applied it in Roemen and Schmit v Luxembourg.164 Similar principles are in the 
Committee of Ministers’ recommendation entitled On the right of journalists not to 
disclose their sources of information.165
 
After HRA 
Before 2000, the English CA judges’ appreciation of the implications of Goodwin was 
variable.166 However, the HRA reproduces the terms of Article 10. Section 3 of the 
HRA provides that, so far as possible, ‘…legislation must be read and given effect in 
a way which is compatible with…’ rights within the European Convention. Section 2 
requires the English courts to take account of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
 
                                                 
160 ibid at [32 – 33]. 
161 ibid at [42]. 
162 ibid at [44 – 45]. 
163 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 2; (1999) 5 B.H.R.C. 654. 
164 Application N. 51772/99, judgment 25 February 2003 and see Ernst and Others v Belgium (App No. 
33400/96)(Chamber Judgment of 15 July 2003), finding a violation of article 10 in a police warrant 
authorised the search of 8 news gathering premises and reporters homes for the purpose of identifying 
sources of leaks in certain criminal cases. 
165 Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 8 March 2000 at 701st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) – followed in 
Brdjanin & Talic n 47 above.  For other European cases see H. Thorgeirdottir, ‘Journalism Worthy of 
the Name: Freedom within the Press and the Affirmative Side of Article 10 of the European Covention 
on Human Rights’ (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 249-253; A. Burns, ‘Access to Media 
Sources in Defamation Litigation in the United States and Germany’ 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 283; 
C. Brants, ‘Journalists and the Protection of Sources of Information in the Netherlands’ in S. Field and 
C. Pelser (eds) Invading the Private: State accountability and new investigative methods in Europe 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).  
166 Compare Gaddafi v Daily Telegraph n 134 above; Camelot Group plc v Centaur Communications 
Ltd n 134 above; John v Express Newspapers n 71 above and commentary in Robertson & Nicol n 65 
above, 264-265; Spilsbury n 133 above, 390 – 392, 396. 
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Ashworth and Ackroyd(1) were the second and third important news gatherer/ 
confidential source cases decided after the HRA.167 To these may now be added the 
judgment of Tugendhat J in Ackroyd (2).  With regard to Ashworth, the following 
points should be noted: 
 
(a) Lord Woolf CJ accepted all aspects of the letter and spirit of Goodwin, including 
the application of the ECHR article 10 approach to section 10, without qualification, 
that is, he accepted constitutional imperative/ weighted balancing protection.168
(b) The Morgan-Grampian interpretation of the ‘interests of justice’ exception in 
section 10 noted above was also accepted,169 an interpretation so broad the section 
does not really provide limited exception protection. 
(c) Protecting the confidentiality of private health data is both a legitimate aim and an 
obligation under the article 8 guarantee of respect for private life.170
(d) ‘Any disclosure of a journalist’s source does have a chilling effect on the freedom 
of the press…. The fact that journalists’ sources can be reasonably confident that their 
identity will not be disclosed makes a significant contribution to the ability of the 
press to perform their role in society of making information available to the 
public.’171
(e) The situation must be exceptional if disclosure of the source is to be justified.172
 
All the Law Lords agreed that the circumstances were exceptional.  The safety of 
patients and staff at Ashworth required that all persons having responsibility for the 
patients be able to have complete faith in the integrity of the PACIS records.  The 
patient’s disclosure of his own medical history was irrelevant to that pressing need.  
There was no public interest in the content of the records.  The source’s disclosure of 
the records was wholly inconsistent with the security of the records – a breach of 
confidence and contract made worse by the fact it was (assumed to have been) 
purchased by a cash payment.  The only way that security could be protected was to 
find and punish the source – hence disclosure in that case was an overriding public 
interest.173
                                                 
167 The first was Financial Times Ltd v Interbrew SA n 134 above, a case involving malicious 
disclosure of partly falsified confidential material.  Selby LJ’s judgment was extensively quoted in 
Ackroyd (2).  For comment on the case see D. Sandy, ‘False Sources and the Freedom of the Press’ 
(2002) N.L.J. 152.7034 (856); M. Stockdale, R. Mitchell, ‘Company Confidentiality and the Freedom 
of the Press: Striking the Balance’ (2003) 24 Comp. Law. 170-177.  
168 See in particular n 21 above at [61- 62]. 
169 ibid at [39-40] read with[49] and see [71] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough. 
170 ibid at [62 - 63], applying Z v Finland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 37, noted in Ackroyd (2) n 24 above at 
[98]. 
171 n 21 above at [61]. 
172 ibid at [66]. 
173 ibid at [66]. 
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Ackroyd(1) was the first time Ackroyd’s long term investigations concerning serious 
mismanagement at the hospital, a consequential public inquiry highly critical of the 
hospital, his use of many sources in the hospital and the absence of payment or reward 
for the sources was in evidence.   This evidence convinced May and Ward LJJ that 
the pressing social need for Ackroyd to identify his source should be considered in a 
full hearing.174  Carnworth LJ said that Ashworth meant that, subject only to rare 
exceptions, there was an over-riding interest in the confidentiality of medical 
records.175 Since the leaked records contained no evidence of mismanagement or 
misbehaviour on the part of hospital staff, no rare exception had been established.176  
However, three years having passed with no evidence of any recurrence or a 
persisting cloud of suspicion over the employees, establishing the ‘pressing need’ for 
disclosure of the source at that time required a hearing.177  
 
Tugendhat J presided over the hearing.  He analysed the importance of news 
gathering in the context of freedom of expression in depth, drawing upon post HRA 
HL case law178 and beyond.  His judgment contains a valuable illustration of an 
exceptionally rigorous and sensitive common law style examination of the evidential 
issues. On the nature of the decision to be made under section 10 after the HRA, his 
extensive quotes from Sedley LJ in Interbrew179 included the following:180
[T]he central exercise is not in any true sense one of discretion.  
Deciding whether disclosure is necessary for one of the listed purposes 
is a matter of hard-edged judgment, albeit one of both fact and law, and 
none the less so for having to respect the principles of 
proportionality….[T]he effect of ss 2 and 3 of the [HRA] has been to 
move the evaluation of necessity further towards the status of a 
question of law…. [Even if the s 10 bar is lifted] other, discretionary, 
bars may still operate…” 
 
On the approach that must be adopted when two Convention rights such as privacy 
and freedom of expression conflict, Tugendhat J181 followed the guidance of Lord 
                                                 
174 Ackroyd (1) n 26 above at [67-70], [88]. 
175 ibid at [75]. 
176 ibid at [76-83]. 
177 ibid at [84-85]. 
178 R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 and also 
the earlier cases of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 and McCartan Turkington 
Breen v Times News Papers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277. 
179 n 134 above.  
180 n 24 above at [83], taken from Interbrew at [45-48]. 
181 ibid at [103-104]. 
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Steyn in In re S (A Child)(Identification: Restrictions on Publication).182  
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other.  Secondly, 
where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus 
on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in 
the individual case is necessary.  Thirdly, the justifications for 
interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account.  
Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. 
 
Tugendhat J said that, since there was no public interest in the particular disclosure, 
the source had breached a duty of confidentiality owed to the hospital, thus 
establishing the threshold condition for a Norwich Pharmacal order.  Analysing the 
comparative importance of the specific rights claimed in the case, Tugendhat J noted 
in particular that the expression Ackroyd was defending was ‘of a kind that attracts 
the highest protection’183 and that Ackroyd’s ‘record of investigative journalism 
which has been authoritatively recognised, so that it would not be in the public 
interest that his sources should be discouraged from speaking to him where it is 
appropriate that they do so….’184 Consequently, on the facts as now known, the 
pressing social need to disclose the source, and hence the proportionality of disclosure 
to the hospital’s legitimate aim to seek redress against the source, had not been 
convincingly established. 
 
Tugendhat J stressed that he had not considered that ‘medical records are less private 
or confidential, or less deserving of protection’185 than the earlier courts.  His result 
was different because, in light of new evidence and the passage of time, his findings 
of fact were different, with consequential effects on his reasoning. He summarized the 
changes:186
[T]he hospital no longer contends that the source acted for money, with 
the result that I have had to find afresh what the purpose of the source 
was, [misguided pursuit of public interest] and to re-assess the risk of 
further disclosure now, in the light of that fact, and in the light of the 
absence of any similar disclosures since 1999.  The extent of 
disclosure by the source was more limited than was previously 
understood… I have not found that the source was one of a number of 
people limited to 200, but that it is impossible to say how large the 
                                                 
182 [2004] UKHL 47 at [17]; [2005] 1 AC 593 at [17]. 
183 n 24 above at [193]. 
184 ibid. 
185 ibid at [196]. 
186 ibid at [197]. 
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group is.  I have not found that the source was probably an 
employee … and even if it was an employee, the numbers who have 
left the hospital since 1999 represent about a third of those who 
worked there in 1999.  So the likelihood of the hospital being able to 
obtain the redress it seeks against the source is correspondingly 
diminished.  In addition, the stance of [the patient] has changed [he 
now supported Ackroyd], and I have not found the disclosure was 
made without his consent.  Finally, unlike the courts in the MGN 
action, I have heard the evidence of Mr Ackroyd and have concluded 
that he was a responsible journalist whose purpose was to act in the 
public interest. 
 
V. THE CASE FOR SPECIAL PROTECTION187
The essentials of any case for special protection against compulsory disclosure of the 
identities of news gatherers’ confidential sources are as follows.  News gathering is 
an essential activity for the maintenance of a modern vibrant liberal democracy. News 
gatherers need to cultivate and use confidential sources in order to be able to carry out 
that activity most effectively.  But news gatherer/ confidential source relationships 
are an exceptionally vulnerable and fragile aspect of news gathering.  Therefore it is 
in the public interest that news gatherer/ confidential source relationships are 
promoted and protected.  Most news gatherers’ confidential sources will cease to be 
able, and many, if able, cease to be willing, to continue as sources if their identities 
are revealed.  General or specific knowledge amongst potential sources that news 
gatherers can be compelled to disclose their identities in court or to their employers or 
a grand jury or commission of inquiry, or have their premises searched to like effect, 
will have a strong chilling effect upon some people who might otherwise be willing or 
persuaded to be confidential sources in the future.  Co-opted as an intelligence 
gathering arm of government or private parties, news gatherers would lose the vital 
credibility of independence.  News gatherers will also be less willing to approach 
sources at risk if they cannot promise effective confidentiality.  Forcing news 
gatherers to disclose confidential sources may even put the physical safety of some 
news gatherers at risk – having a further chilling effect on the willingness of news 
gatherers to investigate news connected to violent/ ruthless people or environments.   
Conversely, the public costs of nondisclosure in terms of lost information, evidence, 
opportunities to suppress or punish wrongdoing are often relatively minimal or 
illusory.  Many private costs can be minimized by other means.  Hence protecting 
                                                 
187 For eloquent advocacy of special protection against disclosure of news gatherers sources see 
Robertson & Nicol n 65 above, 253-256; Nestler n 36 above. 
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news gatherers’ confidential sources from disclosure is very much in the public 
interest. 
 
This does not mean that the public interest in the protection and promotion of news 
gathering must invariably prevail over all other public interests.188  It does mean that 
in this narrow area of identification of news gatherers’ confidential sources, the public 
interest in protecting such sources should nearly always prevail and giving priority to 
any other public interest should never be automatic.  Identification of a confidential 
source always causes some harm to the news gathering process, which harm should 
never be ignored.189
 
It is the underlying premise of this article that the argument for special protection of 
news gatherer/ confidential source relationships is valid and should be accepted.  
Four aspects of that argument outlined above merit brief exploration so as to 
substantiate that position: the extent and character of the public interest in promoting 
and protecting news gathering activity in a liberal democracy; the news gatherers’ 
need for confidential sources; the chilling effect; the public and private costs of 
nondisclosure. 
 
The extent and character of the public interest in protecting and promoting news 
gathering in a liberal democracy 
 
Acceptance as empirical and political fact that news gathering is an essential activity 
in a modern liberal democracy that is both worthy and in need of special promotion 
and protection by the law is the bedrock of any claim for special protection from 
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of news gatherers’ sources and is now 
widespread.190  What must be emphasized here is that the need for news gathering in 
                                                 
188 For recognition that special protection for news gatherers’ sources need not be absolute see: Pember 
n 95 above, 359-360; Robertson & Nicol ibid, 255; L. Powe, Jr, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: 
Freedom of the Press in America (Berkley: University of California Press 1991), 181-188. 
189 See Ashworth Hospital v MGN Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 515 (CA) at [101] per Laws LJ: ‘The public 
interest in the non-disclosure of press sources is constant, whatever the merits of the particular 
publication, and the particular source…[I]t is always prima facie … contrary to the public interest that 
press sources should be disclosed….’, cited with approval in Interbrew SA n 134 above at [11][32] per 
Sedley LJ and Ashworth n 21 above at [66], the latter noted in Ackroyd 2 n 24 above at [86]. 
190 Academic and judicial expositions of the importance of a free press in the traditional sense of a press 
free to publish without censorship as described in British Steel n 5 above, 1168 A-B per Lord 
Wilberforce and Branzburg n 41 above, 681-682 per Justice White, are legion.  Understanding of the 
importance of news gathering as a step towards such publishing was largely confined to the strong 
dissenting judgments in Branzburg n 41 above per Justices Douglas and Stewart (with whom Justices 
Brennan and Marshall agreed) dissenting; British Steel n 5 above, 1184 per Lord Salmon dissenting; 
CBC v Lessard n 87 above at [61-69] per McLachlin J. dissenting but see also the preambles to the 
Guidelines n 109 above, and, the Privacy Protection Act 1980 and the almost universal recognition of 
some form of journalist’s privilege in all but two US jurisdictions noted above.  As to the UK, 
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a liberal democracy extends well beyond the strictly political.  A brief examination 
of news gathering as a source of unofficial news, a watchdog with respect to all 
sources of power and an essential part of effective public debates will make this 
clear.191
 
(i) As a source of unofficial news 
A self-governing people cannot afford to have their knowledge of public, commercial 
and social affairs confined to news chosen for them by official, commercial or social 
power centres.  A self-governing people also needs unofficial, independent, 
non-establishment news gatherers investigating and reporting on their various elites, 
current events, events of historical significance and the nature and extent of unofficial, 
peripheral, underground, criminal, subversive, even terrorist activities actually or 
possibly going on within that people’s society, environs or the larger world.  
Unofficial news is an essential counterweight to official/ commercial/ social 
propaganda, myopia, bias and ignorance. 
 
(ii) A prerequisite for the performance of the watchdog function 
One of the most widely recognized functions of news gatherers, the ‘Fourth/ Fifth 
Estate’, ‘representative of the people’, ‘public watchdog’, ‘government critic’, is to 
uncover and reveal official policies and actions for the people.192  It is certainly not 
possible to rely only upon official sources for this purpose.  But democracy in the 
sense of self governance is not only, or even primarily, about elections and the 
actually or potentially elected.  It is about the distribution, monitoring and constraint 
of all forms of real power within a society – economic, military, social and antisocial, 
as well as the strictly political.  A free people needs news gatherers to uncover and 
reveal the policies and actions of economic, social and military powers as much as of 
                                                                                                                                            
Ashworth and Ackroyd (2) both contain clear affirmations of the importance of news gathering. 
Tugendhat & Christie n 133 above, 451 describe the importance of news gathering by the media as 
‘axiomatic’.  As to Canada, see the strong recognition of the importance of newsgathering in National 
Post n 57 above and Wasylyshen 2005 n 69 above, also the higher court cases cited in the latter case.  
Australian judges have remained less enthusiastic, NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 above at [166] quoting 
Cojuangco n 61 above, but the intervention of the Attorney General in McManus/ Harvey n 32 above 
and current moves to introduce a federal shield law indicate some appreciation of the significance of 
news gathering. 
191 See Nestler n 36 above, 210 – 212 and E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2005), Chapter 1 in which Barendt explores the question, ‘Why Protect Free Speech’.  
Barendt’s first, third and fourth ‘Arguments for a Free Speech Principle’ are closely related to the 
following arguments for the importance of news gathering.  As to Barendt’s ‘Free Speech Interests’, 
the audience and bystander/ public interest are appropriate here.  See also Chapter 12, ‘Free Speech in 
the Media’ in which the vital role of the press as a ‘public watchdog’ is recognized and the implications 
for press freedom analyzed. 
192 J. Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) 253; V. Blasi, ‘The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory’ 1977 AM. B. Found. Res. J. 521; Alexander, n 41 above, 
104-107. 
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political powers.  Recognition of this is crucial to the protection of news gatherers’ 
sources at work in these other spheres.193
 
(iii) A prerequisite to effective public debate  
News gatherers are indispensable to any credible public debate about ideas in 
societies on the scale and with the degree of fragmentation of the present day. News 
gatherers generate, collect and disseminate ideas, information, perceptions and 
interpretations. Through the media and the internet, some provide forums for 
feedback on their own output and disseminate the output of others.  A modern liberal 
democracy would be greatly impoverished without these forums. This is true 
notwithstanding the modern public forum is significantly distorted and individual 
creativity suppressed by the size, commercial/ state ownership and character of 
modern media.194 Denial of protection to news gatherers’ confidential sources is not a 
remedy for these ills. In fact, denying protection to bloggers’ sources might make the 
situation worse. 
 
News gatherers’ need for confidential sources 
Some judges have voiced skepticism about news gatherers’ needs for confidential 
sources and argued that naming of sources keeps both news gatherer and source 
honest.195  In response, news gatherers have attempted to prove that many important 
past news stories depended upon confidential sources.196  There is substance and 
weakness in both positions.  The benefits of knowing the source of information are 
obvious.  If the value of news gathering as described in the previous section is 
accepted, the need for some news gatherers to use confidential sources at least some 
of the time is obvious too.197 Quite simply, some valuable news gatherer/ source 
                                                 
193 Contrast the relatively narrow view of what it was in the public interest for people to know in 
British Steel n 5 above and Branzburg n 41 above, 690-697 per Justice White; Morgan-Grampian n 
134 above 42-43 per Lord Bridge as to national security and the prevention of crime.  
194 L. Powe Jr. n 188 above, chs 7 and 9 makes the relevant arguments. For a sophisticated treatment of 
the democratic functions and obligations of news gatherers and the internal threats to the performance 
of those functions see H. Thorgeirdottir n 165 above. 
195 See Cojuangco n 61 above, quoted in NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 above at [166].  The Canadian 
Supreme Court in Moysa n 88 above, confirmed in Lessard n 87 above, and the majority of the US 
Supreme Court in Branzburg n 41 above, found the case unproven.  Some journalists are likewise 
skeptical, see G. Price, ‘“Pack your toothbrush!” Journalists, confidential sources and contempt of 
court’ (2003) 8(1) Media & Arts Law Review 259; P. Garry, ‘Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the 
First Amendment’ (2005) 78 Temp. L. R. 579. 
196 Branzburg n 41 above, 693-695 and nn 32, 33 per Justice White; NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 28-31; 
National Post n 57 above, 565-566. As to academic research on the use of sources see the on going 
studies of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press n 102 above, specifically intended to 
provide news gatherers with the required evidence; D Sheddon, ‘Anonymous Sources’ at ‘Links to the 
News, Poynterline’ at http://poynter.org/column.asp?id=49&aid=64013 (Last visited 23 March 2006); 
Nestler n 36 above, 249-250; Robertson & Nicol n 65 above, 254-255. 
197 But if proof were needed, it is submitted that amongst the five illustrative cases, Ackroyd and 
McManus/ Harvey are cases in point. 
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relationships cannot withstand exposure to the light – even the partial light of grand 
juries or the protective screens and suppression of names in some public inquiries.  
Outed sources often lose access to the relevant information.  They may also be 
exposed to significant risks: dismissal,198 civil actions for breach of contract or breach 
of confidence, hostility, criminal prosecution199 or violent retaliation, even death. A 
guarantee of confidentiality is necessary in order to secure these sources in the first 
place.  Continued confidentiality is necessary for continued access to the information 
and physical safety for the source.  Surely it cannot be right for society to take the 
benefit of a source’s information but leave the source exposed to harmful 
consequences, even if these are to a considerable extent of the source’s own making, 
unless identification of this particular source would give rise to some exceptional 
public benefit.200  The public interest defence to breach of confidence,201 the 
qualified privilege defence in defamation,202 whistleblower statutes,203 even common 
law judicial statements about protection of sources who disclose iniquity, arise from 
some recognition of this but all are only, as yet, partial solutions. 
  
News gatherers may also suffer from exposure of a source.  At best the news 
gatherer will lose any credibility as an independent observer and may not be able to 
continue their work.  They may also face violent or economic retaliation or 
preventive action from sources or those about whom the sources made disclosures. A 
liberal democracy needs news gatherers to be willing to investigate the high risk 
stories about the powerful, the ruthless and the desperate.204  Like undercover law 
enforcement and secret service personnel, these at risk news gatherers also deserve – 
and reward – our protection.  That includes protection from being used by law 
enforcement or public/ private security as a cheap investigative arm. 
 
The chilling effect 
                                                 
198 This was the whole object of the Ashworth/ Ackroyd cases. 
199 Sometimes in connection with the unauthorized disclosure, as in the In re Grand Jury Subpoena and 
McManus/ Harvey cases, sometimes in connection with crimes they disclose, as in Branzburg n 41 
above, sometimes for crimes unconnected with the disclosure. 
200 Not merely prosecution of petty criminals such as the drug users in Branzburg, perhaps the 
unmasking of senior officials willing to put CIA operatives at risk in order to silence political critics. 
201 For the modern growth of this defence, see Cripps n 71 above; Tugendhat & Christie n 133 above, 
ch 9. 
202 New York Times Co. v Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp. n 85 
above; Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. 257; Reynolds n 178 above. 
203 G. Gunasekara, ‘Whistle-blowing: New Zealand and UK Solutions to a Common Problem’ (2003) 
24 Statute L. Rev. 39; L. Vickers, ‘Whistleblowing in the public sector and the ECHR’ [1997] PL 594, 
cited in Haydon v Canada (T.D.) [2001] 2 F.C. 82. 
204 This was a primary concern of the Appeal Chamber in Brdjanin & Talic n 47 above and see in 
another context, R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A [2000] 1 WLR 1885, 1857 per Lord Woolf 
as to the right to life. 
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The ‘chilling effect’ refers to the effect of disclosure upon present or potential sources 
other than the targeted source. Again, some judges have objected that news gatherers 
have failed to prove any, or any undesirable,205 chilling effect from common law or 
constitutional denial of special protection for news gatherers’ confidential sources.  
A few have asserted a currently vigorous media as evidence of the contrary.206  With 
respect, this is at best speculative.207  Any past or present flourishing of news 
gatherer/ confidential source relationships is as likely to be due to the discouraging 
effects of real or perceived high resource costs for litigants seeking to compel source 
disclosure, the modern practice of prompt destruction of documents, e-mails and other 
evidence of source identity by news gatherers,208 a widespread (mistaken) belief in 
the existence of a journalists’ privilege209 and the largely untested asserted willingness 
of news gatherers to go to jail rather than give up a source, as to the absence of a 
chilling effect from incidents of forced disclosure.  Furthermore, the proof demanded 
is practically impossible to obtain.210  How could a news gatherer set about finding 
people who might have been willing to come forward as a source if the law had been 
different?  It is also unnecessary since common human experience tells us that 
learning of unpleasant things happening to a disclosed source will have a chilling 
effect upon the willingness of some potential sources to come forward. There is no 
way of ensuring that the chill is only felt by sources it is not in the interests of a 
liberal democracy to hear.211  
 
So the real issues with respect to news gatherers’ need for confidential sources are not 
‘if they are needed’ or ‘whether not protecting such sources will make obtaining them 
and keeping them more difficult’ but ‘when and how such sources should be used’ and 
‘when and how such sources should be protected’.  Answers to these ‘when and 
how’ questions require an examination of what interests besides news gathering are at 
stake. 
 
The public and private costs of nondisclosure of news gatherers’ sources 
                                                 
205 British Steel n 5 above, 1184 B-C per Viscount Dilhorne; Moysa v Labour Relations Board n 88 
above at [20]; CBC v Lessard n 87 above at [45] per L’Heureux-Dube J, quoting from Zurcher v 
Stanford Daily n 111 above; Branzburg n 41 above, 693-695 and see Ashworth n 21 above at [65-66] 
per Lord Woolf as to the Master of the Rolls’ comment, “If the [source disclosure] order … discourages 
press sources from disclosing similar information in the future, this will be no bad thing.”  Also Judge 
Tatel in In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 999-1000. 
206 Branzburg n 41 above, 698-699 per Justice White. 
207 Lee, ‘The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege’ n 50 above, 643. 
208 Robertson & Nicol n 65 above, 268; Spilsbury n 133 above, 397. 
209 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 993 per Judge Tatel. 
210 E. Cherminsky, ‘Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive 
Newsgathering’ (2000) 33 U. Rich. L. R. 1143, 1145-1146. 
211 See Branzburg n 41 above, 733-736 per Justice Stewart; In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 
992-993 per Judge Tatel; Nestler n 36 above, 248-249. 
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The content of leaked information may cause economic, emotional and social damage.  
The act of leaking will often involve a breach of confidence or invasion of privacy 
damaging in itself.  Sometimes the victim of a leak may be able to get some 
compensation from the news gatherers but attacking the news gatherer is often a 
second best option, if an option at all.  Allowing a news gatherer to refuse to disclose 
a source may deny a victim of a leak their most desired remedies: damages from or 
prosecution/ punishment/ neutralization of the source, both as an end in itself and to 
deter others. Sometimes, not being able to sue or sanction the source will mean no 
remedy for leak victims at all.  These are real costs, as are the resources spent in 
developing, acquiring and implementing high level security systems and practices 
designed to make unauthorized leaking more difficult, costs that might not be incurred 
if news gatherers did not protect their sources. 
  
Protecting news gatherers from compelled disclosure of their sources may also mean 
no access to valuable information an unidentified source may have. That information 
might be relevant to a grand jury or commission of inquiry investigation, a criminal 
trial or, in rare cases, the prevention of serious crime, terrorism or damage to public 
security.   
 
Can these individual and public costs be accepted as the unfortunate but unavoidable 
price a liberal democracy should be willing to pay for the benefits of good quality 
independent news gathering, at least in most cases, so that special protection of news 
gatherer/ confidential source relationships can be justified? 
 
It is submitted that they can.  If the arguments as to the breadth of the knowledge 
required by a self governing people set out above are accepted, the protection of many 
leakers, even those guilty of ‘wrongdoing’,212 can be justified simply by the truth and 
relevance of the information they disclose.  It is important to remember the 
following.  First, the government itself is by far the largest leaker of official 
information, and hence the largest beneficiary of source protection.213 But officials – 
                                                 
212 Such as theft of documents, breaches of laws prohibiting disclosure, breach of contract, breach of 
confidence, conversion. Cf Bryan, ‘Gerard McManus and Michael Harvey’ at ‘The Oz Politics Blog’ at 
http://www.ozpolitics.info/blog/?p=182 in which Bryan argues the important political neutrality of the 
civil service is violated by leaks like that to these journalists.  The article and consequential discussion 
make interesting points about leaks by officials as well. 
213 Interbrew SA n 134 above at [7], quoted by Justice Tugendhat in Ackroyd (2) n 24 above at [71]: L. 
Manly, ‘Big News Media Join in Push to Limit Use of Unidentified Sources’ 23 May 2005 NY Times 
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/media/2005/0523mediasources.htm (Last visited 14 Oct 2005), 
reported that in early 2005 ‘the Washington bureau chiefs for seven major news organizations’ met with 
the White House Press Secretary about ‘off the record’ background briefings frequently held by 
officials.  Subsequent briefings about Presidential activities were ‘on the record’, perhaps setting a 
new tone for Washington. 
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or law enforcement - are hardly disinterested selectors of what should be leaked or 
with what spin.214  Second, after the ‘knee jerk’ attack on the news gatherer, in many 
cases, the leak victim is able to identify and punish the leaker without any help from 
the news gatherers.215 Third, exposing sources who provide reliable proof of 
contentious policy, errors of judgment or wrong doing, does not save the leak victim 
from the costs that must be incurred in dealing with the issues raised by what was 
revealed, including preventing a recurrence where that is relevant.216  These 
responses may generate real social and individual benefits that are relevant to the true 
costs.  Fourth, the reported cases indicate the ‘loss’ of information in investigation 
cases is seldom crucial to the investigation.  ‘Loss’ may in any case be an 
inappropriate term since, absent the source’s belief in the news gatherer’s promise of 
protection, the public would often not have had that information or evidence 
anyway.217  Fifth, some private costs can be recouped from the news gatherer.  
Finally, except where the protection offered is absolute, the truly exceptional case 
where the private or public cost is unacceptably high can be accommodated by 
(controlled) disclosure if and when it arises. 
 
VI  A WAY FORWARD 
Accepting that news gatherer/ confidential source relationships should have special 
protection, how can such protection be effectively and efficiently achieved?  
 
Absolute protection in the form of a rule forbidding any form of compelled disclosure 
in any circumstances is one option.  It has the real attractions of simplicity, certainty 
and efficiency, but also the weakness of inflexibility.  It does not allow for the 
exceptional hard cases.218  The facts behind the In re Grand Jury Subpoena and Sing 
Tao cases show this is not a merely hypothetical concern. 
 
But then, anything less than absolute protection requires the participation, 
co-operation and commitment of the judges.  This is true even for commissions of 
inquiry or administrative tribunals.  A court will always make the ultimate 
determination of whether a source should be protected.  Even when a court is not the 
                                                 
214 The quote in Ackroyd (2) from Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s speech in Shayler n 178 above is very 
apt.  
215 McManus/ Harvey is on point.  With respect to Cooper/ Miller, the Special Prosecutor knew the 
identity of their sources before he subpoenaed them.  He was seeking confirmation of content. 
216 The Ashworth/ Ackroyd leak provides an illustration.  The Hospital needed to review its practices 
re transfer of prisoners for example. 
217 In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 991 per Judge Tatel; NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 124-127 
per Sweet DJ. 
218 Thereby placing the shield under intolerable pressure, see Castellani v The Scranton Times n 103 
above. 
 38
source of the initial order, only a court has the power to punish for contempt.  But 
many common law judges have proved to be unreliable protectors of news gatherers’ 
sources.  Certainly the common law’s ‘one relevant factor’ protection has been and 
remains ineffective.  ‘No alternative’ protection also has serious weaknesses.  First, 
as noted by the majority in Branzburg,219 it invites ad hoc adjudication of almost 
every request for disclosure.  Second, news gatherers and sources need to make 
confidentiality decisions when the relationship is first formed – the crucial factor in 
the protection, exhaustion of alternatives by the applicant, cannot be determined at 
that time.220 Furthermore, the protection is ineffectual in the not unusual case where 
the whole point of the inquiry or action is discovering the source.221
 
‘At large balancing’ is problematic because it is extremely vulnerable to the common 
law’s legacy of  ‘…almost invariably [treating freedom of speech and hence of the 
press] … as a defence or as an exception or qualification to other well-established 
rights, such as the right to reputation or fair trial rights.’222  Or, it might be added, to 
commercial, government, national security and crime prevention needs for 
confidentiality, all of which many common law judges see much more clearly and 
with greater favour than they do the confidentiality needs of news gatherers.223  
 
The best option would seem to be constitutional imperative/ weighted balancing 
protection in the style of Ackroyd (2).  It seems that many common law judges need 
the permission and the discipline of a constitutional imperative or strong presumption 
in favour of news gatherer/ confidential source protection to overcome or at least 
counterbalance their professional commitments to an evidence/ remedies based 
system of justice and their personal commitments to commercial/ official 
confidentiality and crime prevention.  The history of judicial interpretation of section 
10 of the Contempt Act illustrates the point.  Of course, as the history of judicial 
interpretation of the US First Amendment, the Hong Kong decision in Sing Tao and 
                                                 
219 Lee, ‘The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege’ n 50 above, 649-651. 
220 ibid, 664-670. 
221 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena n 9 above, 997-998 per Judge Tatel but cf Pember, Mass Media Law 
n 95 above, 369 in which Pember claims that where confidential information is sought from a nonparty 
news gatherer ‘a [US] judge typically applies the test very vigorously and normally the journalist will 
not be required to testify’. See, for example, Carolyn Condit v National Enquirer Inc et al 289 F. Supp. 
2d 1175 (Eastern District of California 2003); Price v Time Inc., Don Yaeger n 94 above, both 
defamation cases, and NYT v Gonzales n 47 above, 154-160.  
222 Barendt n 191 above, 41 (emphasis in the original). 
223 Ma CJHC’s judgment in Sing Tao n 28 above, Carnworth LJ’s judgment in Ackroyd (1) n 26 above, 
most of the pre HRA judgments in England, the majority judgments in Lessard n 87 above and most 
other Canadian cases cited herein, most of the Australian cases including NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 
above, the majority judgments in Branzburg n 41 above and post 2000 cases rejecting creative 
interpretations of Branzburg such as Judge Posner’s judgment in McKevitt v Pallasch n 94 above are 
illustrations. 
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Canadian constitutional jurisprudence clearly show, the mere inclusion of appropriate 
words in a constitutional document is not enough.  A strong and sensitive 
commitment to protecting news gatherer / confidential source relationships on the part 
of the judges is also essential.  In fact, such a commitment could deliver substantial 
real protection for news gatherer/ confidential source relationships even where 
constitutional or legislative provisions are lacking or weak.224 Ackroyd (2) provides an 
encouraging indication of what a judgment written by a common law judge with a 
strong and sensitive commitment to the protection of news gatherer/ confidential 
source relationships and a common law lawyer’s approach to the analysis of evidence 
would look like. 
 
Still, a word of warning.  But for the injunction preventing publication of the 
source’s information, the result in Goodwin might have been very different, a position 
many may find unsatisfactory.225 Although Lord Woolf CJ’s and May LJ’s unreserved 
acceptance of the core positions in Goodwin and genuine efforts to address the merits 
from that perspective are encouraging, the judgments in Ashworth and Ackroyd (1) 
still retain some of the weaknesses of the standard common law approach.226   
Like the majority in British Steel,227 the Lords in Ashworth too readily accepted 
AHA’s limited evidence as to access to the information, the unfortunate speculation 
that the source must have been an employee and the character of that employee as a 
paid and disloyal person, not an unpaid public spirited informant.  The Lords placed 
great weight on the need to deter future disclosures from the records – but apparently 
none on the fact that a person’s attitude towards leaking records relating to a man who 
had already publicized much of the same information and records concerning 
                                                 
224 See Pnina Lahav, ‘Conclusion: An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in Democracy’ in 
Press Law in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Study (New York: Longman Inc., 1985), 343. 
225 Ruth Castigan, ‘Journalistic material in the UK criminal process’ in S. Field & C. Pelser (eds), 
Invading the Private: State accountability and new investigative methods in Europe (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998), 245. 
226 The concurring judgments in Ashworth are particularly news gatherer unfriendly. Writing after the 
first two s 10 cases arising after the HRA 1998, one author observed, “Bearing in mind the history of 
litigation in this area [footnote omitted] it is difficult to avoid the impression that outside the world of 
celebrities and show business the [English] courts are still not naturally disposed to be sympathetic 
towards leaks of indisputably confidential information to the media.” P. Milmo, ‘Courting the Media’ 
2003 EHRLR (Special issue: privacy 2003) 1, 9. See also Murphy n 51 above, 466 at n 87 in which 
Murphy observes, ‘[I]t is hard to resist the conclusion that English Courts have much less regard for 
journalistic privilege than do European Courts, including the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
Certainly Lord Woolf has not always shown such understanding of the press, see DPP v Channel Four 
Television Co. Ltd. and another [1993] 2 All ER 517. 
227 See n 5 above, 1166B per Lord Wilberforce who said the source must have been ‘…an employee or 
former employee of B.S.C. …whose work entitled him or her to have access to highly confidential 
documents….and may have been guilty of an act of theft.’  In fact, the source was a rubbish collector.  
Goodwin has claimed that the courts were wrong in their assumptions about his source too, M. 
Holderness, ‘Sources of anxiety: LFB debate at the House of Commons’, noted by Freelance at http:// 
www.londonfreelance.org/fl/0403hoc.html (Last visited 5 September 2005). 
 40
someone who had maintained his privacy might be very different.228  Assuming the 
worst devalues the source and news gathering.  Furthermore, the court approved 
Lord Bridge’s very wide interpretation of the ‘interests of justice’ exception in section 
10 and continued the expansion of Norwich Pharmacal discovery in this context.229  
In Ackroyd (1), Carnworth LJ first accepted the strong presumption in favour of the 
protection of news gatherers’ sources and then reversed it with respect to medical 
records.  There is also the disturbing fact that in both Ackroyd decisions, the 
substantial passage of time since the initial leak was a very significant factor.  It is 
not that the appreciation of the effects of time is unwelcome, on the contrary, but it is 
worrying that a news gatherer’s success might be dependent upon her ability and 
resources to stretch out the judicial process sufficiently. 
 
Our illustrative cases strongly suggest that the practices and attitudes of some 
government officials/ prosecutors and news gatherers also need to change. In less 
turbulent times, though the common law’s denial of special protection for news 
gatherer/ confidential source relationships meant they could, prosecutors seldom 
asked the source question.230 Today, prosecutors are asking fairly frequently for news 
gatherers’ work product – especially photographs and outtakes – and getting it. 
Perhaps these successes have influenced prosecutors’ views of what is appropriate or 
at least possible. Perhaps it is merely the politics of prosecutors that has changed.  
For whatever reason, in North America and Australia in particular, prosecutors and 
officials are, increasingly, also asking the source question.231  With respect, from the 
perspective of true public and personal costs and benefits, the aggressive pursuit of 
news gatherers is almost always unjustified and unwise.232
                                                 
228 Compare the very different approach (not merely the result) on these points of Justice Tugendhat in 
Ackroyd (2).  Justice Tugendhat was very careful not to make assumptions for or against any one. 
229 Lord Woolf CJ n 21 above at [53] rejected Sedley LJ’s position in Interbrew SA n 134 above at [20] 
that the detection of crime was not a proper object of Norwich Pharmacal discovery., even to the point 
of leaving open the possibility of an application by the Attorney General on behalf of the public! 
230 The histories of official attempts to obtain source identities from news gatherers set out in British 
Steel n 5 above and Branzburg n 41 above show relatively little activity in the relevant jurisdiction 
before those cases.  Significantly, both decisions prompted limiting legislation, though in the case of 
Branzburg not in the relevant jurisdiction! 
231 Nestler n 36 above, 234-237 documents increased activity in the US.  Other commentators have 
noted recent increases in grand jury subpoenas for news gatherers, D. Eggan , ‘White House Trains 
Efforts on Media Links’ 5 Mar 2006 at 
http://www.washingtonpost,com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/04/AR2006030400867.html.  In 
Australia, as to a sudden flurry of cases in the 1990’s, see Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia, (1993) Project No 90 ‘Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications’ at [4.15 - 
4.16]; R. Ackland ‘Bring Unto Me Your Sources for Sacrifice’ 1993 Issue 11 City Ethics.  This has 
continued into the 21st century. 
232  The Australian Federal Attorney General informed the Chief Judge of the Victorian Court of the 
likely adoption of a qualified privilege for news gatherers’ sources in the near future, a fact he said 
“might be relevant to whether imprisonment is an appropriate penalty” for McManus and Harvey. The 
NRMA eventually dropped its case against news gatherers, ‘Turning Up The Heat: The decline of press 
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As for the news gatherers, the circumstances of the original publications that 
eventually led to In re Grand Jury Subpoena and Sing Tao give cause for real concern. 
Many journalist codes urge news gatherers to regard a confidentiality agreement as a 
last resort233 and then only if the news gatherer honestly believes the source and the 
information are credible.234 Some media organizations additionally require that the 
identity of any confidential informant be known to at least one editor.235 In the US, it 
is said that at least since 2004 these requirements are being more vigorously 
enforced.236 One certainly hopes that this is so.  The point is all news gatherers who 
argue for special protection for news gatherer/ confidential source relationships need 
to take their public interest responsibilities very seriously. They need to be vigilant to 
ensure that news gathering serves rather than threatens liberal democracy, that is, that 
the public benefits of publishing on confidentiality terms clearly outweigh the public 
and private costs of both the publication of the material and any subsequent disclosure 
or nondisclosure of sources.  Such disinterested vigilance is both the justification for 
and the price of special protection for news gatherer/ confidential source 
relationships.237
 
Unfortunately disinterested vigilance was lacking in the circumstances that gave rise 
to In re Grand Jury Subpoena and Sing Tao.  All the Hong Kong and some of the US 
news gatherers238 made very poor public interest judgments.  They failed to 
                                                                                                                                            
freedom in Australia 2001-2005’ at [2.6], in PDF on Alliance on Line at 
www.alliance.org.au/content/view/32/52/ (Last visited 8 July 2006). Lord Saville decided not to 
proceed against Alex Thompson and Lena Ferguson n 8 above. Even the defendants in Branzburg were 
not ultimately pursued for their sources! 
233 Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance Code of Ethics, Clause 3 (Australia); Pember n 95 above, 
360; Holsinger & Dilts n 83 above, 358-360. Interestingly, the Code of Ethics of the Hong Kong 
Journalists Association and the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice n 4 above do not.  
Such agreements need not be absolute, being subject to judicial command to the contrary as in Totalise 
v Motley Fool Limited n 40 above or findings of falsehood on the part of the source, ‘Statement of 
Journalistic Ethics for The Daily Press, Inc. News Department’ at 
http://www.dailypress.com/services/site/dp-confidentiality,0,7979614.htmlstory (Last visited 25 
October 2005). 
234 Preferably after crosschecking with other sources – even at the risk of inviting an injunction in some 
common law jurisdictions. 
235 See The New York Times Company, ‘Confidential News Sources’ at 
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-sources.html (Last visited 26 Mar 2006 (effective 
March 2004); L. Downie Jr, ‘The Guidelines We Use to Report the News’ 7 Mar 2004 at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35470-2004Mar6?language=printer (Last visited 23 
Mar 2006); D. Offer, ‘It is rare that we don’t identify a source’, 21 August 2005 Kennebec Journal 
online at http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/view/columns/1880207.shtml (Last visited 25 
October 2005); ‘Statement of Journalistic Ethics for The Daily Press, Inc. News Department’ n 237 
above. 
236 Manly, ‘Big News Media Join in Push to Limit Use of Unidentified Sources’ n 213 above. 
237 Barendt n 191 above, 421-424, in which Barendt describes his third perspective on the relationship 
between freedom of the press and freedom of speech. 
238 Paradoxically, Cooper and Miller were two of the least blameworthy of the news gatherers in this 
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appreciate that the story the people in their respective liberal democracies needed to 
know was not that supplied by the source but the fact that the particular source had 
supplied it, and they published and/or republished information about an individual 
that increased the chances of personal injury to that individual or her associates, with 
minimal or no compensating public benefit.  There was also the real possibility that 
the source(s) had manipulated the news gatherers and abused news gatherer/ source 
protection in ways damaging to liberal democracy without any compensating benefit.  
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena the source may have been attempting to stifle or at least 
discredit another person’s inconvenient, politically significant speech – the antithesis 
of freedom of expression. In HK the effectiveness and integrity of criminal process 
were threatened.  So, the news gatherers wrote the wrong stories and they protected 
the wrong people.239
 
How should constitutional imperative/ weighted balancing protection for news 
gatherers’ confidential sources be applied in such circumstances?  Robertson and 
Nicol suggest that a promise of confidentiality to a source obtained by a trick or 
where ‘it turns out the source has tried to involve the journalist in a serious criminal 
conspiracy’ might give way to a higher morality.240  Using a strong constitutional 
imperative approach, including taking full account of the Hong Kong ICAC’s use of a 
warrant rather than a subpoena, and given the absence of any showing of real public 
interest in the identities of the CIA agent or protected witness, a judge would be 
justified in concluding that the public interest in protecting the physical safety of 
people assisting in law enforcement and national security requires news gatherers and 
possible sources to be fully aware there would be no special protection from judicially 
compelled disclosure of source identity in such circumstances.  The possible sources 
would then choose other strategies. 
 
What of the other illustrative cases?  How would they fare in a common law 
jurisdiction in which there is constitutional imperative protection against judicially 
compelled disclosure for news gatherers’ sources?  It is submitted that Ackroyd (1) 
and (2) and McManus/Harvey would never reach a judge.  Those who would wish to 
compel disclosure in such circumstances would surely be advised they would not get 
                                                                                                                                            
respect.  Miller had not published anything and Cooper was the first to question why top White House 
officials were releasing this information, see E. Eun, ‘Journalists Caught in the Crossfire: Robert 
Novak, the First Amendment, Journalist’s Duty of Confidentiality’ (2005) 42 Am. Crim.L.Rev. 1073, 
1088. 
239 See also E. Wasserman, ‘Essay on Source Confidentiality: A Critique of Source Confidentiality’ 
(2005) 19 ND J.L. Ethics & Pub Pol’y 553; P. Sussman, ‘A Response: Journalists have another option 
--- report the misinformation effort’ 23 Nov 2005 at 
http://www.gradethenews.org/commentaries/leakspv.htm. 
240 n 64 above, 255.  
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the orders they seek.241 Ashworth might still proceed.  The case for protection of 
medical records generally is very strong though substantially weakened by the 
patient’s own disclosures in this case, stronger still if the physical security of staff and 
patients really was at risk, but the case for public exposure of further problems with 
the particular institution was also very strong.  At least a constitutional imperative 
analysis should mean the issues could be more speedily resolved, in the unusual 
combination of circumstances in that case probably in the source’s favour. 
 
As to other types of case, absent physical safety or truly compelling law enforcement/ 
national security concerns, constitutional imperative source protection would 
normally prevail in criminal cases arising out of the disclosure or publication only.242  
In criminal cases unconnected with the disclosure, no news gatherer should wish or be 
permitted to remain silent about information that has a real chance of preventing a 
person suffering physical harm243 or wrongful conviction.244  Sometimes, swearing 
that the defendant was not the news gatherer’s source may be sufficient.  Sometimes, 
and subject to taking all possible steps to ensure the news gatherer’s and the source’s 
safety, identification of a source may be strictly necessary. Most credible sources will 
understand this. Otherwise, the public interest in protecting news gatherer/ 
confidential source relationships would still prevail. 
 
As to breach of confidence and defamation, for defamation cases, the newspaper rule 
should be retained as a straightforward, cost effective proxy for constitutional 
imperative protection at the pre-trial stage.245  More generally, constitutional 
                                                 
241 Likewise for NRMA v John Fairfax n 49 above and R v National Post n 57 above. 
242 So, a constitutional imperative analysis would produce a different result in Secretary of State for 
Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd n 134 above, at least on the evidence then advanced by the 
government and notwithstanding the HL’s primary fear of more damaging leaks from the politically 
motivated source in the future. 
243 Robertson & Nicol n 65 above, 255. Protection of the arsonist source as described by J. White, 
‘Smoke Screen: Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply Providing Cover for 
Criminals like the Serial Arsonist?’ (2001) 33 Ariz. St. L.J, 909 does seem the wrong call. Cf N. 
Martin-Clark who, in breach of a promise of confidentiality, voluntarily testified against a source who 
admitted to a brutal murder, noted in Jyotika Oberoi, ‘The Source of All Trouble … Revelations and 
Reservations’ in global village at 
http://vega.soi.city.ac.uk/-abbc281/global_village/2006/01/the_source_of_all_troubler...(Last visited on 
28 January 2006).  He was, however, strongly criticized by his professional colleagues.  See also 
‘Newspaper reporter to testify at capital murder trial’ posted on News Media Update on 31 May 2006 
at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2006/0531-con-newspa.html (Last visited 7 July 2006).  The reporter’s 
testimony would be restricted to published statements about a jailhouse interview with the defendant. 
244 L. Powe, Jr. n 188 above, 187 – 188 makes the point very forcefully.  There is a parallel with law 
enforcement informants, see Keane [1994] 1 WLR 764, although the government also has the option of 
offering no evidence, choosing protection of the informant over a conviction.  A news gatherer can 
only make that choice before publication, Miller not even then. 
245 There is evidence that English defamation laws inhibit the use of confidential sources so that the 
apparent effectiveness of this law in protecting confidential sources may be misleading, R. Weaver, A. 
Kenyon, D. Partlett, C. Walker, ‘Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. Times Newspapers and 
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imperative protection would ensure that breach of confidence and defamation actions 
could not be used to intimidate news gatherers and actual or potential sources in 
genuine public interest cases,246 whilst leaving room for the exceptional case where 
the value of the source’s information in terms of even the widest vision of self 
governance is minimal but the risk of significant economic harm or privacy invasion 
element is very high.  However, many of these cases – especially those in the private 
sector – should be settled on the basis of financial decisions.  Celebrity stories that 
have only gossip value will normally be selected for their perceived commercial or 
perhaps status value for the publisher.  So, it is not unreasonable to adopt rules that 
compel news gatherers to consider potential costs as well as benefits when granting 
confidentiality and again at the time of publication.  Such rules might reduce the 
source issue to a matter of evidence.  Quite simply, no source means no evidence – 
which in turn may mean no defence.  Some courts in the US have developed such 
rules.247 Some news gatherers might take out insurance.  All would need to consider 
very carefully before publishing low public interest value but damaging information 
relying only on a protected confidential source – but that is as it should be. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the English Media’ (2004) 37 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1255 but that alone is no reason to remove it. 
246 As may have occurred in Ken Peter’s case, a Canadian news gatherer punished for refusal to 
disclose his source in a defamation action arising out of an article disclosing serious problems in a local 
retirement home, reported 8 December 2004 by IFEX at 
http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/63083 (Last visited 6 June 2005) 
247 R. Berger, ‘The “No-Source” Presumption: The Harshest Remedy’ 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 603 (1987); 
Lois Ayash, M.D. v Dana Farber Cancer Institute et al 13 Mass. L. Rep. 1 (default judgment entered 
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above.  For an argument in support of this solution in defamation cases see Garry ‘Anonymous 
Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment’ n 195 above. 
 
 45
